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As governments increasingly delegate traditionalpublic functions to private,forprofit entities,the federal civil rights statute, 42 USC § 1983, has the potential to play an
important role in encouragingprivate entities to respect constitutionalrights when they
take on public duties. That potential is undermined,however, by the prevailing view that
private entities subject to § 1983 should be exempt from the traditionaltort principle of
respondeat superior liability simply because the Supreme Court already has held that
municipalentities are exempt. Exemptingprivate entities carriessignificantimplications,
not only because of the growing privatizationof government functions, but also because
respondeat superior liability often is criticalfor fulfilling tort law objectives of deterrence and compensation.
This Article examines differences regardinghow private entities and governmental
entities behave and contends that those differences justify imposing respondeat superior
liability on private § 1983 defendants even if public § 1983 defendants remain exempt.
Initially, the Supreme Court's rationale for exempting municipalities from respondeat
superior liability was particularto public entities and does not justify exempting private
partiesfrom respondeatsuperior liability.Additionally, as a policy matter, the fact that
profit-motivated,private entities may be both more responsive than electorally accountable public entities to tort liability incentives and less responsive to other nonfinancial constraints on behavior suggests that respondeatsuperior may be better suited for deterring
private misconduct than public misconduct. Imposing respondeat superior liability on
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privateparties thereforecan help ensure that when privatepartiesagree to perform importantpublic functions; they will not diminish importantconstitutionalvalues.

INTRODUCTION

Traffic was at a crawl in Baghdad's Nisour Square on the afternoon of September 16,2007 when several American guards in the area
noticed one car moving slowly in their direction. Although the car
was still far away from the guards' convoy, one guard opened fire,
shooting the driver, Ahmed Heithem Ahmed, in the head.2
Mr. Ahmed's body slumped forward onto the accelerator, causing the

car to continue to approach the guards.' The guards responded not just
by firing on the car, but by opening fire in all directions across the
crowded square.' Iraqi civilians, none of whom appeared to present a
threat and many of whom were running for safety away from the
guards, were shot and killed.' All told, the guards' "barrage of gunfire"
killed seventeen Iraqi civilians, including children, and wounded as
many as twenty-seven more.6 The incident sparked widespread public
outcry and prompted an FBI investigation.' The FBI concluded that
the overwhelming majority of the shootings were unjustified and violated US rules on the use of deadly force in Iraq.8
One might wonder how members of the United States Armed
Forces, who undergo rigorous training regarding deadly force and rules
of engagement, could commit this kind of violence. The answer is that
they did not. Rather, the shooters were employees of Blackwater USA,
a private company that contracted with the federal government to provide security and military support services for the State Department
1 David Johnston and John M. Broder, EBI. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis without Cause,
NY Times Al (Nov 14,2007); James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin, From Errandto FatalShot to Hail
of Fire to 17 Deaths,NY Times Al (Oct 3,2007).
2
Glanz and Rubin, From Errandto FatalShot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths, NY Times at
Al (cited in note 1).
3

Id.

Id.
Johnson and Broder, FB.. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqiswithout Cause, NY Times at Al
(cited in note 1); Glanz and Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths, NY
Times at Al (cited in note 1).
6
Glanz and Rubin, From Errandto FatalShot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths, NY Times at
Al (cited in note 1). See James Glanz, New Evidence that Blackwater Guards Took No Fire, NY
Times Al (Oct 13, 2007).
7
See Frank Rich, The "Good Germans"among Us, NY Times A13 (Oct 14,2007).
8
See Johnson and Broder, ERB.L Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis without Cause, NY Times at
Al (cited in note 1).
9 See John M. Broder and David Rohde, State Dept. Use of ContractorsLeaps in 4 Years,
NY Times Al (Oct 24,2007).
4

5
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Blackwater is just a single example of the growing trend of privatization of traditional and sensitive public functions. Although the
Blackwater incident occurred overseas and involved privatization by
the federal government, '° the same type of privatization-which is
defined generally as "government use of private entities to imple-

ment government programs or to provide services to others on the
government's behalf""- also is occurring with increasing frequency
domestically, particularly at the state and local levels.'2 State and local governments have contracted with private parties to perform a
wide array of core government services-often very sensitive servic-

es-including operating prisons, 3 providing medical care to prisoners," administering welfare and public benefits programs," processing
10 This Article, which focuses on 42 USC § 1983, concerns constitutional responsibilities
arising out of the privatization of state and local government functions. Constitutional claims
against the federal government are governed by Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the
FederalBureau of Narcotics,403 US 388 (1971), and its progeny.
11 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatizationas Delegation,103 Colum L Rev 1367,1370 (2003).
12 See id at 1379 ("Privatization seems likely only to expand in the near future, fueled by
increasing belief in market-based solutions to public problems."); Jody Freeman, Extending
Public Law Norms through Privatization,116 Harv L Rev 1285, 1289 (2003) (observing "a discernable trend toward 'privatization,' which in the American context consists largely of contracting out"); Paul Howard Morris, Note, The Impact of ConstitutionalLiability on the Privatization
Movement after Richardson v. McKnight, 52 Vand L Rev 489,493 (1999). At the federal level, for
example, government contracting to private parties increased by 50 percent from 2002 to 2005.
See Kerry Korpi, Panel Discussion, Outsourcing Government? The Privatizationof Public Responsibilities (American Constitution Society Annual Convention June 13, 2008), online at
http://www.acslaw.org/node/6787 (visited Aug 9,2009).
13 As of June 30, 2007, 7.4 percent of all US prisoners were housed in private facilities.
30,379 federal prisoners and 87,860 state prisoners were in private facilities. William J. Sabol and
Heather Couture, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Prison Inmates at Midyear 2007 5 (DOJ
June 2008), online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pimO7.pdf (visited Aug 9,2009). Additionally, private prisons hold alien detainees facing deportation or other immigration-related
charges. See Margaret Talbot, The Lost Children, New Yorker 58 (Mar 3, 2008). By the mid1980s, private facilities held nearly 30 percent of detained aliens. See James Austin and Garry
Coventry, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons 12 (DOJ 2001),
online at http://www.ncjrsgov/pdffilesl/bjal181249.pdf (visited Aug 9,2009).
14 Correctional Medical Services (CMS), one of the larger prison healthcare companies,
provides health services to over 200,000 inmates. See Correctional Medical Services, About Us,
online at http://www.cmsstl.comlabout-us/index.asp (visited Aug 9, 2009). Another company,
Prison Health Services (PHS), provides health care for an additional 270,000 prisoners. See
Alfred C. Aman, Jr, An Administrative Law Perspective on Government Social Service Contracts:
Outsourcing Prison Health Care in New York City, 14 Ind J Global Legal Stud 301,302 (2007).
CMS estimates that 42 percent of all prison health services are provided by private companies.
See Correctional Medical Services, About Us.
15 As many as forty states have privatized aspects of their welfare and public benefits
administration and delivery programs and have spent billions on contracts with private welfare
providers. See Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1383-88 (cited in note 11); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract,45 Ariz L Rev 83, 87-88 (2003);
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parking tickets,16 providing private security services," collecting gov8 fighting fires,'9 and overseeing foster care and child
ernment debts,"
placement programs.20 With billions of dollars in federal aid from the
recently enacted economic stimulus package going to state and local
governments,2' privatization opportunities should only increase.'

As governments continue to delegate public functions to private
companies, it is critically important to determine the appropriate set
of background rules against which privatization takes place in order to
ensure that private companies give proper respect to public values
and constitutional rights. The federal civil rights statute, 42 USC

§ 1983-which is the primary vehicle for protecting individuals from
violations of their constitutional and federal statutory rights by state
actors and which applies to private entities that perform traditional
public functions-is a potentially potent tool for holding private entities constitutionally accountable. Currently, however, that statute encourages private entities to give constitutional rights short shrift because it does not expose private entities that perform public functions
to the traditional tort principle of respondeat superior liability-that
is, holding an employer liable for the torts of its employees committed

Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration:Rules, Discretionand Entrepreneurial
Government,75 NYU L Rev 1121,1180 (2000).
16 See, for example, Ace Beverage Co v Lockheed Information Management Services, 144
F3d 1218,1219 (9th Cir 1997) (finding that a private company that processed parking tickets for
the city of Los Angeles acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983).
17 See, for example, Powell v Shopco, 678 F2d 504,505 (4th Cir 1982) (finding that a private
security guard could be sued under §1983); Groom v Safeway, 973 F Supp 987, 991-92 (WD
Wash 1997) (holding that a grocery store acted under color of state law when it hired an off-duty
police officer to work as a private security guard). See also Flagg Bros v Brooks, 436 US 149,
163-64 (1978) (identifying police protection as a traditional public function).
18 See, for example, Del Campo v Kennedy, 517 F3d 1070, 1072-73 (9th Cir 2008) (describing how a private company sought to collect debts owed to the state of California).
19 See Jesse McKinley, On the Fire Lines, a Shift to Private Contractors,NY Times All
(Aug 18,2008). See also Flagg Bros,436 US at 163-64 (identifying fire protection as a traditional
public function).
20 See, for example, Donlan v Ridge, 58 F Supp 2d 604,610-11 (ED Pa 1999) (holding that
a private foster care provider acted under color of state law); Bartell v Lohiser,12 F Supp 2d 640,
649-50 (ED Mich 1998) (finding that a private contractor who provided foster care acted under
color of state law and could receive qualified immunity).
21 The economic stimulus package was enacted as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-5, 123 Stat 115. Billons of dollars in that package are dedicated
to state and local government projects. See, for example, Governors v. Congress, Wall St J A14
(Feb 23,2009) (noting that the stimulus bill provides $150 billion to the states).
22
At the same time, recent evidence suggests that the economic downturn is hampering
certain forms of privatization, such as the sale of public assets to private buyers. See Leslie
Wayne, Politicsand the FinancialCrisisSlow the Drive to Privatize,NY Tunes B3 (June 5,2009).
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within the scope of employment.2 Even though Blackwater itself
would not be subject to § 1983 because it contracted with the federal

government rather than with a state or local government,7 the Blackwater incident exemplifies the risks that accompany any attempt to
privatize core government services, whether at the federal level or at
the state and local levels. This Article contends that private parties

that perform public functions, and are therefore covered by § 1983,
should be subject to respondeat superior liability.
Section 1983 provides a private right of action against anyone
who violates federal constitutional or statutory rights while acting
"under color" of state law. Although § 1983 primarily applies to state
and local governments, courts also have found-through the evolution

of the state action doctrine-that private entities act "under color of
law" for purposes of the statute when they perform traditional public
functions or act jointly with the government. 26
23 See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 905 (West 2000) (defining respondeat superior
liability). See also Part III.A.
24
Because Blackwater contracted with the federal government rather than with a state or
local government, § 1983 could not be used to hold Blackwater accountable. In fact, the Supreme
Court has held that there is no private cause of action for constitutional violations committed by
a private company performing services for the federal government. See CorrectionalServices
Corp v Malesko, 534 US 61, 66 (2001) (refusing to "confer a right of action for damages against
private entities acting under color of federal law").
25
42 USC § 1983 (making liable to private suit any person who deprives another of the
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" when acting under color
of state law). See also Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1, 3-4 (1980). Because the bulk of § 1983 actions allege constitutional violations, for ease of reference, this Article will refer to § 1983 as
protecting "constitutional" rights.
26
There is no firm rule for determining what constitutes state action, though the Supreme
Court has articulated several different tests. Generally, state action exists only if there is a sufficiently "close nexus" between the private action and the state such that "seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the state itself." Brentwood Academy v Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association, 531 US 288, 295 (2001), quoting Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co,
419 US 345, 351 (1974) (quotation marks omitted). Under the "public function" test, a private
party qualifies as a state actor when it performs a function that was traditionally and exclusively
governmental. See Lee v Katz, 276 F3d 550,554-55 (9th Cir 2002). State action also occurs when
a private party is a "willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." Brentwood,
531 US at 296 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Satisfaction of a single test may be sufficient to find state action. See id at 303 (suggesting that when the facts show that one state action
test is satisfied, "the implication of state action is not affected by pointing out that the facts might
not loom large under a different test"). For ease of reference, this Article uses the term "traditional public function" or the equivalent to refer to instances where private parties may perform
state action.
Although merely contracting with the government to perform a service does not give rise to
state action, see generally Rendell-Baker v Kohn, 457 US 830 (1982) (finding that private school
teachers acting under a state contract were not state actors), courts have relied on the public
function and joint action tests to subject private parties performing traditional public functions
to § 1983. See, for example, West v Atkins, 487 US 42, 52-54 (1988) (finding that a doctor who
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When individuals have sued private entities and their employees

under § 1983, those entities understandably have attempted to cloak
themselves in the same protections from liability afforded to government defendants under § 1983. In particular, private entities have
sought (successfully) to shield themselves from respondeat superior

liability for § 1983 violations. The source of this protection comes from
the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Monell v Departmentof Social

Services27 regarding the scope of municipal liability. The Monell Court
held that although municipal entities can be sued for damages, they

cannot be sued on a respondeat superior theory.n Instead, a municipality is liable for damages only if the plaintiff can show that some action
directly attributable to the municipality itself-a municipal "custom or
policy"-caused the violation.9 The gap between showing an underlying violation and showing a municipal custom or policy, however, is a
vast one, and in practice the "custom or policy" standard has proven
very difficult to satisfy.n°
provided medical care to prisoners under a contract with the state acted under color of law for
purposes of § 1983); Flagg Bros, 436 US at 163-64 (identifying police and fire protection as traditional public functions); Tool Box v Ogden City Corp, 316 F3d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir 2003) (indicating that performing "necessary municipal functions" and running nursing facilities constitute
state action); Hicks v Frey, 992 F2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir 1993) ("It is clear that a private entity
which contracts with the state to perform a traditional state function such as providing medical
services to prison inmates may be sued under § 1983 as one acting 'under color of state law."');
Donlan, 58 F Supp 2d at 610-11 (finding that a private foster care provider acted under color of
state law because foster care through the Department of Human Services is a traditionally governmental function analogous to incarceration); Groom, 973 F Supp at 991-92 & n 4 (holding
that a private store acted under color of law by hiring an off-duty police officer to provide security services); J.K. v Dillenberg,836 F Supp 694, 699 (D Ariz 1993) (finding that a private entity
that contracted with the state to provide state-mandated health services through a government
program was a state actor). See also Lee, 276 F3d at 555-57 (finding that a private party overseeing a state-owned public park was a state actor).
27 436 US 658 (1978).
28 Id at 691 ("[W]e conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat
superior theory.").
29
Id at 694. See also Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v Brown, 520 US
397,403 (1997) (stating that a plaintiff must "identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused
the plaintiffs injury" in order to recover damages).
30
See, for example, Harold S. Lewis, Jr, and Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's
Asymmetry, 140 U Pa L Rev 755, 795-97 (1992) (noting that it will be the "rare case" where
governmental misconduct rises to a level of custom or policy, and stating that a single act of
government misconduct will almost never constitute a custom or policy). It even may be more
difficult to establish municipal liability under § 1983 than to establish liability for punitive damages for a private employer. See David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal
Liability under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 Fordham L Rev
2183, 2193-94 (2005). Section 1983 makes municipalities liable only for the misconduct of those
employees with "final policymaking authority" whereas a private actor may be liable for punitive

2009]

Regulating Privatized Government through § 1983

1455

Although both scholars and the Supreme Court have devoted at-

tention to whether other § 1983 liability protections, such as qualified
immunity, should be extended to private parties,3' there has been comparatively little discussion of whether private entities should be sub-

ject to respondeat superior liability for the torts of their employees. 2
For victims of constitutional injuries, however, the availability of respondeat superior liability may be as important as, or more important
than, whether an individual employee is protected by qualified im-

munity. In most tort cases, recovery comes not from the individual
tortfeasor but from the entity employing the tortfeasor, and that entity
typically is sued under a respondeat superior theory.3 Additionally, in

many cases, recovery against the individual employee may not be a
viable option because individual employees often are judgment proof,
protected by common law immunity, difficult to identify, or less likely

than companies to possess liability insurance.
Nor does employer indemnification solve this problem because
employees often will be immune if they act in good faith-meaning
there would be nothing to indemnify-and indemnification clauses
often do not cover bad faith behavior.-" Indemnification, unlike respondeat superior, does not provide recovery where the misbehaving

employee can claim good faith immunity, which generally applies undamages for the misconduct of the broader category of "managerial agents." See id, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (1977).
31
With respect to scholarship on private-party immunity, see, for example, Clayton P
Gillette and Paul B. Stephan, Richardson v. McKnight and the Scope of Immunity after Privatization, 8 S Ct Econ Rev 103,139 (2000) (arguing that withholding qualified immunity from private
employees may be justified in certain circumstances but not in others); Robert G. Schaffer, Note,
The Public Interest in Private Party Immunity: Extending Qualified Immunity from 42 U.S.C
§ 1983 to Private Prisons,45 Duke L J 1049, 1086-87 (1996) (arguing in favor of qualified immunity); Charles W. Thomas, Resolving the Problem of Qualified Immunity for Private Defendants in Section 1983 and Bivens Damage Suits, 53 La L Rev 449,491-93 (1992).
The Supreme Court has also addressed private-party immunity under § 1983. See Richardson v McKnight,521 US 399,412 (1997).
32
Professor Barbara Kritchevsky has devoted some attention to this question as part of an
article devoted more broadly to private parties and § 1983. See Barbara Kritchevsky, Civil Rights
Liability of Private Entities, 26 Cardozo L Rev 35, 73-76 (2004). Kritchevsky's discussion provides a useful starting point for a more comprehensive analysis of whether a private entity
should be exempt from § 1983 respondeat superior liability.
33
See Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr, and Oscar S. Gray, 5 Harper,James and Gray
on Torts § 26.1 at 5 (Aspen 3d ed 2008) ("[I]n the vast majority of cases the plaintiff seeks satisfaction from the employer alone."). One study of more than 1,500 negligence cases from 18751905 found that "[in less than four per cent of the cases in our sample was the defendant accused of actually being negligent. In all other cases the defendant was sued on the basis of the
alleged negligence of employees or (in a few cases) children." Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J Legal Stud 29,32 (1972).
34 Ibis argument is developed more fully in Part IV.A.

1456

The University of Chicago Law Review

[76:1449

less the employee acts with actual malice.35 And although immunity is
not available where an employee does act with malice, many indemnification clauses exclude intentional, reckless, or malicious conduct.6
Moreover, respondeat superior is more effective than indemnification
in the not uncommon situation where a victim cannot identify which
employee committed the violation but can identify the employer. As a
result, even with widespread indemnification, the absence of respondeat superior liability threatens to leave many victims of constitutional violations with an imperfect recovery or no recovery at all."
Similarly, the availability of state tort actions against private entities does not ensure adequate protection of constitutional rights.
Putting aside whether constitutional rights have a special value and

deserve their own remedy that does not depend on state tort law,
many constitutional rights, including free speech, due process, and
reproductive choice, do not have state common law analogues.- Even

if they did, the fact that state law, unlike § 1983, does not provide for
attorneys' fees and in many cases has been limited through various
tort reform measures makes state law an unrealistic option for many
victims of constitutional injury. 9
Moreover, although scholars have devoted significant attention to
whether municipalitiesshould be subject to respondeat superior liability," the scope of damages liability for private parties arguably is just as

important as it is for municipal entities. This is because municipalities
are the only governmental institutions that can be sued for damages
35
36

See id.
Id.

37
Although a plaintiff who lacks a viable claim against the municipality has the option of
suing high-level municipal officials in their personal capacity for damages under a theory of
supervisory liability, that claim may be just as difficult to win as a claim against a municipality.
Not only must a plaintiff overcome a good faith immunity defense, but the standard for supervisory liability is high. Generally, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor was grossly negligent or
deliberately indifferent in failing to prevent a subordinate from violating constitutional rights.
See, for example, Poe v Leonard, 282 F3d 123, 140 (2d Cir 2002). Additionally, whether courts
will continue to recognize supervisory liability is uncertain in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937, 1948-49 (2009). The Iqbal Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a federal defendant in a Bivens action could be held liable on a supervisory
liability theory and held that "each Government official, his or title notwithstanding, is only
liable for his or her own misconduct." Id at 1949. See also id at 1957 (Souter dissenting) (stating
that "the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens
supervisory liability entirely"). It is unclear whether courts will apply that reasoning to § 1983
actions.
38
This argument is developed more fully in Part .B.

39

See id.

For a sample of some of the commentary questioning the wisdom of Monell's decision
on municipal liability, see note 70.
40
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under § 1983; state governments are not "persons" under § 1983 and are
protected from damages by Eleventh Amendment immunity.4' By contrast, although private entities perform only a small (but increasing)
percentage of traditional public functions, private entities can be sued
for damages both when they contract with a municipality and when
they contract with a state, since private entities are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.2
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether private entities
subject to § 1983 should be exempt from respondeat superior liability.
The overwhelming majority of lower courts, however, have extended
Monell's respondeat superior exemption to private parties. 3 This outcome, at first blush, seems intuitively appealing. After all, if the only
reason private parties are subject to § 1983 is because they perform
state action, then it makes sense to grant them the same protections
given to governmental defendants.
This intuition is flawed. As this Article explains, private entities
that fall within § 1983 because they perform public functions should
be subject to respondeat superior liability. Extending Monell's municipal exemption from respondeat superior liability to private parties is
misguided for both doctrinal and policy reasons. First, as a matter of
statutory construction, the textual and legislative history justifications
for creating a municipal exemption from respondeat superior liability
were specific to public entities and do not apply to private entities,
even private entities that perform governmental functions." Second,
from a policy perspective, government actors and private actors may
respond differently to the incentives created by tort liability such that
respondeat superior may be justified for private entities regardless of
whether it is justified for public entities.' Specifically, the financial risk
of a damages award may be more effective at deterring profitmaximizing private firms -including firms that perform public functions -than electorally motivated government actors. Conversely, oth-

41 See, for example, Will v Michigan Department of State Police, 491 US 58, 66-67 (1989)
(holding that states are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 and are entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity for damages actions). State officials, however, can be sued in their official
capacities for injunctive relief Kentucky v Graham, 473 US 159, 165-67, 167 n 14 (1985), citing
Ex Pane Young, 209 US 123 (1908).
42
See, for example, Del Campo, 517 F3d at 1072 (holding that a private debt collector that

was collecting government debts pursuant to a contract with a state was not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from damages).
43
44

See note 78 and accompanying text.
See Part II.

45

See Part III.
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er public accountability mechanisms, such as negative publicity and
electoral considerations, may be more effective in keeping government actors in check than private actors."6 Consequently, exempting
private parties from respondeat superior liability for violating federally protected rights threatens to inadequately deter constitutional violations and to leave victims with insufficient remedies, thereby undermining § 1983's twin purposes of deterrence and compensation.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the Supreme
Court's § 1983 jurisprudence regarding municipal liability and explains the Court's rationale for creating an exemption from respondeat superior liability. Part II addresses whether Monell's interpretation of § 1983's text and legislative history to exempt municipalities
from respondeat superior liability applies to private parties. Part III
considers whether, as a matter of policy, there are differences in how
tort liability and other constraints affect public and private entities
that justify imposing respondeat superior on private entities even if
municipalities remain exempt. Finally, Part IV examines whether employee indemnification and state tort law already create adequate incentives for private entities to protect constitutional rights and explores the implications of a rule of private § 1983 respondeat superior
liability on the privatization movement.
I. MONELL AND THE MUNICIPAL RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
EXEMPTION

The Supreme Court's consideration of municipal liability under
§ 1983 began with its 1961 decision in Monroe v Pape." Monroe involved
allegations that Chicago police officers broke into and ransacked the
plaintiffs' home in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Although the
Court held that the individual police officers could be sued under § 1983,
it determined that the City of Chicago could not because it was not a
"person" within the meaning of the statute. 9 In concluding that § 1983
did not apply to municipalities, the Court relied heavily on the legislative
debate concerning the statute and specifically on Congress's rejection of
an amendment to the statute known as the Sherman Amendment. The
Sherman Amendment would have made municipalities vicariously liable
not just for the misconduct of their employees (respondeat superior), but
46
47

See Part III.A-B.

365 US 167 (1961).
Idat 169.
49 See id at 187 (concluding that "Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit" of § 1983).
48
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also for the misconduct of private citizens anytime those citizens
breached the peace." The Court concluded that Congress rejected the
amendment because it believed that the Constitution prohibited it from
imposing obligations on municipalities, which were instrumentalities of
the state and therefore subject to state regulation."
Monroe's exclusion of municipalities from § 1983 lasted just seventeen years before the Court overruled that portion of the decision
in Monell v Departmentof Social Services. Monell held that municipalities were "persons" that could be sued for damages under § 1983 but
that they could not be sued on a respondeat superior theory.52 In Monell, a group of female municipal employees challenged a policy of the
City of New York requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves
of absences before those leaves became medically necessary. 3 In holding that municipalities were "persons" for purposes of § 1983, the
Court reexamined the legislative history of the Sherman Amendment.
This time, the Court concluded that Congress did not perceive a
constitutional problem with imposing liability on municipalities in
general, but instead that Congress believed that it could not constitutionally impose liability on municipalities in a way that interfered with
the ability of states to regulate their municipalities." Municipalities
were considered to be creatures of the state," and under the nineteenth-century doctrine of dual sovereignty, Congress believed that
the Constitution prohibited it from imposing obligations on municipalities that would conflict with state-created duties or impair a municipality's ability to carry out state policies." According to the Court,
Congress saw no dual sovereignty problem with requiring municipali50 Id at 188-92.
51 See, for example, Monroe, 365 US at 190, quoting Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess 804
(Apr 19,1871).
52 436 US at 691.
53 Id at 660-61.
54 See id at 678-82.
55 Monell identifies several examples of key congressional representatives characterizing
municipalities and counties as state instruments. Representative Samuel Shellabarger referred to
a county as "an integer or part of the state." Id at 672-73, quoting Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st
Sess 751 (Apr 18, 1871). Representative Blair, a strong opponent of the Sherman Amendment
whose statements the Court relied upon heavily, called municipalities "creations of the state
alone." Id at 674, quoting Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess 795 (Apr 18,1871).
56 For example, Representative Blair emphasized that states "say what [municipalities']
powers shall be and what their obligations shall be," and argued that the federal government is
not permitted to add to those obligations. Monell, 436 US at 675, citing Cong Globe, 42d Cong,
1st Sess 795 (Apr 18, 1871). See also Monell, 436 US at 678. For additional discussion of the dual
sovereignty doctrine and its relevance to § 1983, see Achtenberg, 73 Fordham L Rev at 2210
(cited in note 30).
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ties to enforce the Constitution, and therefore the Court had no problem concluding that municipalities were subject to § 1983." With respect to forcing municipalities to keep the peace by imposing liability
for the riotous acts of its citizens as the Sherman Amendment would
have done, the Court concluded that Congress feared that creating
these new obligations could impede states from setting municipal
priorities and could require municipalities to assume obligations-such
as creating their own police forces in order to quell riots-that conflicted with those priorities." The foundation of Congress's constitutional concern was federalism-namely that Congress could not usurp a
state's authority to determine how to regulate its own municipalities.
Although the Court found that the legislative history supported
including municipalities within the reach of § 1983, it held that this
same history foreclosed making municipalities liable for the torts of its
employees under a respondeat superior theory. Here, the Court analyzed §1983's statutory text "against the backdrop" of the Sherman
Amendment's legislative history.9 With respect to the text, the Court
noted that the statute imposed liability on any person who "subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any person ... to the deprivation of any"

federal right. The Court appeared to assume that the phrase "subjects, or causes to be subjected" meant "directly causes," stating that
this language "cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on
government bodies.'6 The Court, however, did not rely solely on the
text, perhaps recognizing that the text is at best ambiguous. After all,
there is no inherent inconsistency between the concept of causation
and vicarious liability. As other scholars have pointed out in criticizing
Monell,causation is an essential element of negligence, yet respondeat
61
superior applies routinely to negligence actions.
Instead, the Court interpreted the text in light of the legislative
history. Although it acknowledged that Congress's rejection of the
extreme form of vicarious liability proposed in the Sherman Amendment did not compel rejection of lesser forms of vicarious liability,
57

Monell, 436 US at 680-82.

58

Idat673.

Idat691.
Id, quoting 42 USC § 1983.
61 Monell, 436 US at 692.
62
See, for example, Lewis and Blumoff, 140 U Pa L Rev at 787-88 (cited in note 30) (attacking Monell's reasoning by noting that "causation is an invariable prerequisite of liability for
civil harms"); Susanah M. Mead, 42 US.C. §1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture,65 NC L Rev 517,533 (1987) ("Actual causation is an element that the
plaintiff must prove in any tort case regardless of the legal theory of liability.").
59

60
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such as respondeat superior, it nonetheless concluded that a respondeat superior rule "would have raised all the constitutional problems
associated with the obligation to keep the peace" that Congress refused to impose in the Sherman Amendment." The Court then put the
text and the legislative history together and held that "Congress' rejection of the only form of vicarious liability presented to it [when]
combined with the absence of any language in § 1983 which can be
easily construed to create respondeat superior liability" supported the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to subject municipalities to
respondeat superior liability." In other words, the phrase "subjects, or
causes to be subjected" did not automatically foreclose vicarious liability, but instead was too ambiguous to provide a basis for imposing it
over Congress's constitutional concerns. The Court did not hold, however, that municipalities were completely immune from damages. It
concluded that a municipality can be liable for damages if a municipal
policy or custom is the driving force behind the violation."
The consequences of Monell's policy or custom requirement for
plaintiffs are significant. Even though the policy or custom requirement has expanded to situations beyond explicit, written policies,
courts still have fashioned the standard into a much higher bar than
traditional respondeat superior liability. For example, a plaintiff can
establish municipal liability by showing either (1) that the unconstitutional conduct of a municipal employee was known to and tolerated
by municipal policymakers or (2) that the municipality should have
known of the risk that the employee would violate constitutional
rights when it made its hiring decision. The Supreme Court, however,
has held that the first avenue requires showing that the municipality
was "deliberately indifferent" in failing to address the risk that the
employee would violate constitutional rights," and that the second
avenue requires showing that the constitutional violation was the
"plainly obvious consequence" of the hiring decision. 7 Moreover,
Monell, 436 US at 692-93. The Court also considered several policy rationales for respondeat superior, specifically that employers are better risk bearers than employees and that
accident costs should be spread to the community as a whole in the form of municipal liability
rather than falling solely on the employee. See id at 693-94. The Court did not question the
merits of either rationale, but concluded that Congress would have found them insufficient to
overcome the constitutionalobjections to the Sherman Amendment. See id at 694.
64 Id at 692 & n 57 (stating that its interpretation of the phrase "subjects, or causes to be
subjected" was supported by the legislative history of the Sherman Amendment).
65 Id at 694.
66 See City of Canton v Harris,489 US 378,388-89 (1989).
67 See Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v Brown, 520 US 397,411 (1997).
Even gross negligence will not satisfy this standard. Id at 407.
63
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rarely will a municipality be liable for a single constitutional violation
of an employee, as establishing a custom or policy generally requires
showing a pattern or practice of misconduct.' And if that were not
enough, a plaintiff cannot establish municipal liability simply by showing that the misconduct was endorsed by any supervisory or managerial employee; the plaintiff must show that a municipal official
clothed with "final policymaking authority"-a much narrower
group-knew of and tolerated the unconstitutional actions.' These

hurdles, none of which are part of ordinary tort law, make it very difficult to hold municipalities accountable under § 1983.
Virtually from the time it was decided, scholars have criticized
Monell's rationale for exempting municipalities from respondeat supe-

rior liability.70 In particular, several scholars have pointed out that municipalities were subject to respondeat superior liability when § 1983 was
enacted and have argued that Congress likely intended to incorporate

preexisting common law liability rules." Additionally, scholars have
pointed out that Congress's rejection of an extreme and unprecedented
liability rule that would have made municipalities liable for the torts of
private citizens hardly compels the conclusion that Congress also would

have rejected the more conventional rule of making municipalities liable for their employees' torts. 72 By contrast, few have jumped to Mo68
In Brown, the Court distinguished between a constitutionally "deficient training 'program' necessarily intended to apply over time to multiple employees" and a single instance of
unconstitutional behavior by a municipal employee, which would not suffice to make a municipality liable. Id at 407-08, quoting Harris,489 US at 390-91. See also, for example, Burge v St.
Tammany Parish,336 F3d 363, 369-73 (5th Cir 2003) (stating that deliberate indifference by a
municipal policymaker "generally requires a showing of more than a single instance of the lack
of training or supervision causing a violation of constitutional rights"). But see Pembaur v City of
Cincinnati,475 US 469,480 (1986) (holding that "municipal liability may be imposed for a single
decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances").
69
See Pembaur,475 US at 481-83. See also Lewis and Blumoff, 140 U Pa L Rev at 794-95
(cited in note 30) (explaining the difficulty of meeting the "final policymaking authority" standard).
70 See, for example, Steven Stein Cushman, Municipal Liability under Section 1983: Toward
a New Definition of Municipal Policymaker, 34 BC L Rev 693, 728-29 (1993); Lewis and Blumoff, 140 U Pa L Rev 755 (cited in note 30); Jack M. Beermann, A CriticalApproach to Section
1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 Stan L Rev 51, 76-77 (1989); Peter H. Schuck,
Municipal Liability under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort Law and Organization Theory,
77 Georgetown L J 1753, 1789-91 (1989); Larry Kramer and Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability
under Section 1983:A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 S Ct Rev 249, 300-01 (1987); Mead, 65
NC L Rev 517 (cited in note 62); Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Monel Defining the Scope of
Municipal Liability in FederalCourts, 51 Temple L Q 409, 444-45 (1978).
71 See, for example, Mead, 65 NC L Rev at 526-27 (cited in note 62); Blum, 51 Temple L Q
at 413 n 15 (cited in note 70).
72
See, for example, Achtenberg, 73 Fordham L Rev at 2210 (cited in note 30); Jack M.
Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DePaul L Rev 627, 642-43
(1999) ("Expecting a municipality to prevent its employees from violating federal rights is quite
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nell's defense, and many of those who do support Monell do not defend
the Supreme Court's reasoning but instead suggest that limiting munic-

ipal § 1983 liability may be wise for pragmatic reasons."
The question that scholars have not analyzed is the one that Monell left open: whether private entities that fall within § 1983 because
they perform public functions should be exempt from respondeat superior liability. While some critics of Monell may argue that the best
solution is simply to overrule it and to subject all entities, both public
and private, to respondeat superior liability, it is important to address
the distinct question of whether Monell should apply to private parties. First, despite thirty years of attacks on Monell, the Supreme Court
repeatedly has reaffirmed it7" and does not seem likely to overrule it in
the near future.s For better or for worse, Monell is the law of the land,

and therefore it is important to determine how far that decision
should extend. Second, not everyone believes that Moneil created a
bad result. Some believe that limitations on § 1983 liability like those
established in Moneil are important because judicial interpretation of

§ 1983 has expanded the statute's reach too far." This Article also aims
different from placing upon a municipality the obligation to prevent private citizens from engaging in riotous conduct.").
73 For a defense of Moneil's reading of the legislative history, see Terrence S.Welch and Kent
S. Hofmeister, Prapotnik,Municipal Policy and Policymakers:The Supreme Court's Constrictionof
Municipal Liability, 13 SIU L J 857, 881 (1989). Some scholars who question Monell's doctrinal
underpinnings also suggest that the decision may be defensible for pragmatic reasons. See, for
example, Myriam E. Giles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The DeterrentEffect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 Ga L Rev 845, 861-65 (2001) (proposing that Monelts custom or policy
requirement strikes an acceptable balance in deterring government misconduct); Michael J.Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability under
Section 1983,62 S Cal L Rev 539,542-43 (1989) (asserting that Monell balances competing interests
of maintaining municipal accountability and preserving principles of federalism).
74
See McMillian v Monroe County, 520 US 781,783 (1997); Brown, 520 US at 415 ("As we
recognized in Monell and have repeatedly reaffirmed, Congress did not intend municipalities to
be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights."); Jett v Dallas Independent School District, 491 US 701, 735-36 (1989);
Harris,489 US at 399-400; City of St Louis v Prapotnik,485 US 112, 127-31 (1988); Pembaur,475
US 469,480-81; City of Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 US 808,821-24 (1985).
75 To be sure, Justices John Paul Stevens, Stephen Breyer, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have
called for a "re-examination" of Monell. See Brown, 520 US at 431 (Breyer dissenting, joined by
Stevens and Ginsburg). That call, however, occurred more than ten years ago, and the Court has
not taken any steps toward limiting, let alone overruling, Monell. Nor is there any indication that
the Court's newest justices, John Roberts, Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotomayor believe that Monell should be overruled.
76 See, for example, Sheldon H. Nahmod, 1 Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation:The
Law of Section 1983 § 1.7-1.8 (West 4th ed 2008) (describing common criticisms of § 1983). See
also Crawford-El v Britton, 523 US 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia dissenting) (decrying the broadening
of § 1983 and lamenting the "tens of thousands" of § 1983 suits that are filed each year).
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to convince those Monell defenders that the decision should not be
extended to private parties performing traditional public functions.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue since
Monell," the overwhelming majority of lower courts have extended
Monell's respondeat superior exemption to private entities." Typically,

however, those courts have engaged in little analysis, but instead seem
to have concluded that private entities should be treated identically to

municipalities without saying why that is the case." The lower court
77 Prior to Monell, however, the Court hinted that private parties that jointly conspire with
state actors to violate constitutional rights could be held liable via respondeat superior. In
Adickes v S.H. Kress & Co,398 US 144 (1970), the Court found that a plaintiff could sue a department store under § 1983 if the store's employees engaged in a joint conspiracy with the state.
Id at 152. Although the department store was the defendant, there was no contention that the
store had to act pursuant to an unconstitutional custom or policy to be held liable based on the
acts of its employees. Rather, the Court held that the lower court erred in granting summary
judgment to Kress because there was an issue of fact as to whether a state policeman "reached
an understanding with some Kress employee" to refuse to serve the plaintiff because she was in
the company of African-Americans. Id at 157. Since Monell, however, lower courts have not
applied Adickes when considering private-entity vicarious liability under § 1983. It is interesting
to note that even though at that time a plaintiff could not directly sue either a state or a municipality under § 1983, the Court apparently saw little concern with holding a private entity (as
opposed to a private employee) liable.
78 See, for example, Rodriguez v Smithfield Packing Co, 338 F3d 348, 355 (4th Cir 2003);
Dubbs v Head Start, Inc, 336 F3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir 2003); Natale v Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F3d 575,583 (3d Cir 2002); Jackson v Medi-Car, Inc, 300 F3d 760, 766 (7th Cir
2002); Johnson v Correctional Corp of America, 26 Fed Appx 386, 388 (6th Cir 2001); Sena v
Wackenhut, 3 Fed Appx 858,861 (10th Cir 2001); Street v Correctional Corp of America, 102 F3d
810, 818 (6th Cir 1996); Austin v Paramount Parks, Inc, 195 F3d 715, 727-28 (4th Cir 1999); Sanders v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 984 F2d 972, 975 (8th Cir 1993); Harvey v Harvey, 949 F2d 1127,
1129-30 (11th Cir 1992); Rojas v Alexander's Department Store, Inc, 924 F2d 406, 408 (2d Cir
1990); Taylor v List, 880 F2d 1040, 1046-47 (9th Cir 1989); Goodnow v Palm, 264 F Supp 2d 125,
130 (D Vt 2003); Mejia v City of New York, 228 F Supp 2d 234, 243 (EDNY 2002); Goode v Correctional Medical Services, 168 F Supp 2d 289,292 (D Del 2001); Thomas v Zinkel, 155 F Supp 2d
408,412 (ED Pa 2001); Parent v Roth, 2001 WL 1243563, *3 (ED Pa); Kruger v Jenne, 164 F Supp
2d 1330,1333-34 (SD Fla 2000); Andrews v Camden County, 95 F Supp 2d 217, 228 (D NJ 2000);
Edwards v Alabama Department of Corrections, 81 F Supp 2d 1242, 1255 (MD Ala 2000); Smith v
Ostrum, 2000 WL 988012, *3 (D Del); Donlan v Ridge, 58 F Supp 2d 604,611 (ED Pa 1999); Jones v
Sabis Educational System, Inc, 52 F Supp 2d 868, 878 (ND I11
1999); Allen v Columbia Mall, 47 F
Supp 2d 605,613 n 12 (D Md 1999); Otani v City & County of Hawaii, 126 F Supp 2d 1299,1305-06
(D Hawaii 1998); Raby v Baptist Medical Center, 21 F Supp 2d 1341,1357 (MD Ala 1998); Robinson
v City ofSan Bernardino Police Department, 992 F Supp 1198,1204 (CD Cal 1998).
A few district courts, however, have asserted that Monell should not apply to private entities.
See, for example, Hutchison v Brookshire Brothers, Ltd, 284 F Supp 2d 459, 473 (ED Tex 2003);
Segler v Clark County, 142 F Supp 2d 1264, 1268-69 (D Nev 2001); Taylor v Plousis, 101 F Supp
2d 255,263 n 4 (D NJ 2000); Groom v Safeway, Inc, 973 F Supp 2d 987,991 n 4 (WD Wash 1997);
Moore v Wyoming Medical Center, 825 F Supp 1531,1549 (D Wyo 1993).
79
One of the more detailed federal appellate decision on this issue may be Powell v Shopco, 678 F2d 504 (4th Cir 1982), which appears to be the primary source for subsequent circuit
decisions extending Monell to private parties. Even there, however, the court's discussion was
limited to one paragraph. The court briefly summarized Monell and then simply concluded,
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approach raises two questions. One is whether principles of statutory
interpretation support reading § 1983 and Monell to exempt private
entities from respondeat superior liability. The second is whether, as a
policy matter, public entities and private entities should be treated
identically with respect to respondeat superior liability. The next two
Parts explore each of these questions.
II. WHETHER MONELL EXTENDS TO PRIVATE ENTITIES

Before considering whether policy concerns support distinguishing private entities from municipalities for purposes of § 1983 respondeat superior liability, there is the threshold question of whether Monell's interpretation of the phrase "subjects, or causes to be subjected"-to eliminate municipal vicarious liability-requires a similar
interpretation for private entities. Two background principles of
§ 1983 and tort law can assist in answering that question. First, in interpreting § 1983, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the members of the Congress enacting § 1983 were familiar with the common
law of torts and that "they likely intended these common law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary."'" Second,
when Congress enacted § 1983 in 1871, just as now, respondeat superior liability was a well-accepted and standard principle of tort law."'
Assessing Monell against these background principles suggests
three reasons why, as a matter of statutory interpretation, it should not
be extended to private entities. First, Congress's concern that vicarious
liability would unconstitutionally interfere with state prerogatives is
inapplicable to private parties. Second, although both municipalities
and private parties were subject to respondeat superior liability for
ordinary torts at the time § 1983 was enacted, municipalities had other
liability protections that roughly approximated § 1983's current custom or policy requirement whereas private parties had no such protections. Thus, reading the ambiguous phrase "subjects, or causes to be
subjected" against the backdrop of 1871 common law supports imposing respondeat superior liability on private entities even if municipalities remain exempt. Third, although the Congress enacting § 1983
without any explanation, that "[n]o element of the Court's ratio decidendi lends support for
distinguishing the case of a private corporation [from a municipality]." Id at 506.
80 City of Newport v Fact Concerts,Inc,453 US 247,258 (1981).
81 The principle of respondeat superior liability for private entities

was well accepted in
1871. See, for example, Joseph Story, Commentarieson the Law ofAgency 536-600 (Little, Brown
5th ed 1857); Oliver W. Holmes, Agency, 4 Harv L Rev 345, 356 (1891) ("The maxim of respondeat superiorhas been applied to the torts of inferior officers from the time of Edward I to the
present day."). See also Beermann, 48 DePaul L Rev at 645 (cited in note 72).
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probably did not anticipate that private parties would fall within the
statute, several factors suggest that in the absence of any constitutional objection, Congress likely would not have intended to exempt private parties from respondeat superior liability.
A. Reinterpreting the Statutory Text
First, Monel's explanation for Congress's refusal to impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities rests on a rationale specific to government actors. According to the Monell Court, Congress's
main concern was that imposing such liability on municipalities would
be unconstitutional. That constitutional concern was grounded in
federalism; Congress believed that it could not impose obligations on
municipalities -considered instrumentalities of state governmentthat would interfere with the state's ability to regulate municipalities.
The Court then concluded that Congress would have perceived municipal vicarious liability as placing an unconstitutional burden on
municipalities. But that constitutional concern is inapplicable to private entities, which are not creatures of the state (even when they contract with the state) and which therefore can be regulated without
creating any corresponding constitutional difficulty.83
Simply showing the lack of a constitutional impediment to imposing private respondeat superior liability, however, is not determinative
because there remains Monell's interpretation of the phrase "subjects,
or causes to be subjected"-at least with respect to a municipality-to
mean "directly causes" and therefore to prohibit respondeat superior
liability. Here is where the phrase's ambiguity with respect to vicarious
liability comes into play. It appears that the Monell Court did not conclude that the text was sufficiently clear on its face to eliminate vicarious liability, but instead concluded that in light of Congress's constitutional objections to the Sherman Amendment, the phrase was too
ambiguous to support a respondeat superior rule for municipalities.
See notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
The inapplicability of Congress's constitutional concern to private parties was a strong
justification for one of the few federal district court decisions holding that private parties should
be subject to respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See Hutchinson v Brookshire Brothers,
Ltd, 284 F Supp 2d 459,472-73 (ED Tex 2003).
Professor Barbara Kritchevsky makes a similar point in arguing that private entities should
be subject to respondeat superior liability under § 1983. She asserts that "[tihere are no constitutional impediments to imposing liability on private parties that act under color of state law."
Kritchevsky, 26 Cardozo L Rev at 74 (cited in note 32). Her rationale differs slightly in that she
asserts that imposing liability on a private party "does not subject the taxpayers to liability" in
the same way that it would through municipal liability. Id.
82
83
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Whereas the ambiguous nature of the phrase may have supported
exempting municipalities from respondeat superior liability, that ambiguity works in the opposite direction for private parties because the
constitutional concern is not at issue. Put another way, just as Monell
found that "subjects, or causes to be subjected" was too ambiguous to
express a clear intent to read municipal respondeat superior liability
into § 1983 over Congress's constitutional objection, the phrase similarly is too ambiguous to read out the preexisting common law rule of

private respondeat superior liability in the absence of any constitutional or similar objection." The text therefore should be read to support private respondeat superior liability even if it simultaneously eli-

minates municipal respondeat superior liability. The absence of any federalism concern with imposing liability on private parties, combined
with an existing default rule of private party respondeat superior liability of which Congress was likely aware, supports the conclusion that
§ 1983's text does not compel exempting private parties from vicarious
liability.
Second, interpreting "subjects, or causes to be subjected" to impose respondeat superior liability on private parties while exempting
municipalities finds additional support in the background rules of nineteenth-century tort law. To be sure, there is a general consensus that
at the time of § 1983's enactment, both private entities and municipalities were vicariously liable for the torts of their employees." In the
nineteenth century, however, municipalities (but not private parties)
possessed other forms of common law immunity that, with some differences, roughly approximated Monell's custom or policy require-

84 Kritchevsky offers a different textual argument, which although persuasive, proves too
much because it would apply to municipalities as equally as it would to private entities. She
asserts that the text encompasses respondeat superior because entities have no independent identity and act only through their employees and agents. Kritchevsky, 26 Cardozo L Rev at 74 (cited in
note 32). This argument, however, is equally applicable to municipalities, which also cannot act
separately from their employees and agents, and therefore casts doubt on Monell itself. Thus, to the
extent that Monell remains good law, it would appear to foreclose this argument.
85 The weight of authority appears to support the conclusion that when § 1983 was enacted
respondeat superior applied to municipalities as well as to private parties. See, for example,
Weightman v Washington, 66 US (1 Black) 39, 50 (1861) (stating that municipalities "are liable
for the negligent and unskillful acts of their servants and agents"); Mead, 65 NC L Rev at 527
(cited in note 62); Eugene McQuillin, 6 The Law of Municipal Corporations§ 2823 at 1135 (Callaghan 2d ed 1937). See generally City of Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 US 808, 836-37 & nn 8-10
(1985) (Stevens dissenting) (citing cases applying respondeat superior principles to municipalities). The same is true today. Eugene McQuillin, 18 The Law of Municipal Corporations § 53.69
(West 3d ed 2008).
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ment.a Relevant here is the then-popular but now-abandoned "government-proprietary" distinction, which reflected the fact that municipalities performed both public and private functions.g Under this doctrine, municipalities were liable for their employees' torts when employees performed "proprietary" acts designed to advance the municipalities' private interests.N At the same time, because municipalities
were considered instruments of the states created to help further state
objectives, they were treated as agents of the state entitled to state sovereign immunity when performing public or governmental duties.89

Because many constitutional violations arise out of public rather
than private behavior,' this distinction would appear to vastly reduce
municipal liability under § 1983, even where the unconstitutional actions reflected a municipal custom or policy. As other scholars have
pointed out, however, municipal officials were not immune from governmental acts where the official authorized, directed, or ratified the
wrongful act,9" or where the official failed to properly supervise its
employees' behavior or screen them before hiring. 9 Because municipalities were considered to be equivalent to public officials, these limi-

86 See, for example, Tuttle, 471 US at 818 n 5 (stating that "certain rather complicated
municipal tort immunities existed at the time § 1983 was enacted"); Kramer and Sykes, 1987 S Ct
Rev at 262 (cited in note 70) ("[M]unicipal corporations were insulated from liability by various
immunity doctrines not applicable to private corporations."). See generally McQuillin, 18 Municipal Corporationsat § 53.05 (cited in note 85) (summarizing various traditional forms of municipal immunity).
87 See Owen v City of Independence, 445 US 622,644-45 (1980) (explaining that the municipal corporation was a "corporate body ... capable of performing the same 'proprietary' functions
as any private corporation"). See also McQuillin, 18 Municipal Corporationsat § 53.02.10 (cited in
note 85) (explaining that the governmental-proprietary distinction generally "has been abandoned"). For a more thorough discussion of the governmental-proprietary distinction and its relevance for municipal § 1983 liability, see Achtenberg, 73 Fordham L Rev at 2222-37 (cited in note 30).
88 See Owen, 445 US at 645; McQuillin, 18 Municipal Corporations at § 53.23 (cited in
note 85);Achtenberg, 73 Fordham L Rev at 2223 (cited in note 30).
89 See Owen, 445 US at 645 ("On the other hand, the municipality was an arm of the State,
and when acting in that 'governmental' or 'public' capacity, it shared the immunity traditionally
accorded the sovereign."); McQuillin, 18 Municipal Corporations at § 53.24 (cited in note 85)
(stating that a municipality is immune when it "is performing a duty imposed upon it as the agent
of the state in the exercise of strictly governmental functions."); Achtenberg, 73 Fordham L Rev
at 2233 (cited in note 30); Kramer and Sykes, 1987 S Ct Rev at 262 (cited in note 70).
90 See, for example, Ronald M. Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Liability Doctrine, 65
Georgetown L J 1483,1521 n 156 (1977) (noting that "cities and city officers are rarely in a position to infringe constitutional rights except when engaged in functions traditionally viewed as
governmental"). See also Kramer and Sykes, 1987 S Ct Rev at 262-63 (cited in note 70).
91 Achtenberg, 73 Fordham L Rev at 2233 (cited in note 30); Kramer and Sykes, 1987 S Ct
Rev at 263 & n 52 (cited in note 70).
92 Achtenberg, 73 Fordham L Rev at 2233-36 (cited in note 30).
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tations applied to municipalities as well.3 These exceptions roughly

approximate the avenues for establishing a municipal custom or policy
under § 1983, which permits municipal liability where municipal officials know of and tolerate unconstitutional behavior, or where they
are deliberately indifferent to the risks of constitutional violations
stemming from their hiring and training decisions. Although the threshold for invoking the exemption to the governmental immunity doc-

trine appears to be lower than the custom or policy threshold, particularly with respect to claims of improper hiring or supervision," the
nineteenth-century tort regime at least suggests that private-entity

defendants received fewer liability protections than municipal defendants. 9' Private parties were subject to a traditional respondeat supe-

rior regime while municipal entities were liable for their employees'
acts only in more limited circumstances. Thus, reading the ambiguous
phrase "subjects, or causes to be subjected" against the backdrop of
different common law rules for public and private entities supports
interpreting the phrase to impose respondeat superior on private entities even if it is also interpreted to exempt public entities.

One potential problem with this interpretation is that it would
imbue a single phrase of statutory text -"subjects, or causes to be subjected"-with different meanings for different parties. For municipalities, that language would eliminate vicarious liability, while for private
parties it would permit vicarious liability. Although reading the same

text differently for different parties may seem problematic, it is neither unprecedented nor inconsistent with statutory interpretation

principles. For example, in United States v United States Gypsum Co,9
See id at 2233.
See id at 2235-36 (noting that under nineteenth-century tort law, municipal officers
could be held liable for negligent hiring decisions). Negligence, even gross negligence, is insufficient to establish a custom or policy. See, for example, Board of County Commissioners of Bryan
County v Brown, 520 US 397,407 (1997).
95 To be sure, the reasoning behind the governmental-proprietary distinction raises the
question whether private parties that act "under color of law" because they perform public services should be considered arms of the state and therefore entitled to the same immunities bestowed on municipalities. I believe this view is unpersuasive. First, municipalities are state creations and extensions of the state government. Private parties, even ones that perform public
functions, have an identity distinct from the state itself. Second, private entities, even when engaged in public activities, work for private profit, and therefore their activities could be classified
as proprietary and not subject to immunity. Third, it appears that private entities that performed
traditional public functions, such as operating private prisons, historically did not receive municipal or sovereign immunity. See, for example, Richardson v McKnight, 521 US 399, 404-06 (1997)
(detailing that in the nineteenth century, private prison contractors were not immune from liability for their employees' torts).
96 438 US 422 (1978).
93
94
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the Supreme Court held that § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which
imposes both civil and criminal liability for antitrust violations, contains an intent requirement for criminal liability but not for civil liability 7 Importantly, the Court rested its conclusion in part on background common law principles, emphasizing that intent is an "indispensable element of a criminal offense."" Given that the Court has
cautioned in a different context that § 1983's text "is not to be taken
literally" but must be read in light of the common law," reading "subjects, or causes to be subjected" differently for private and municipal
entities is sensible and consistent with § 1983's purposes."

Additionally, the interpretive canon of "constitutional avoidance" - which cautions courts to interpret a statute narrowly when
necessary to avoid a constitutional problem -supports reading
§ 1983 differently for private entities than for municipalities. While the
constitutional concerns associated with imposing vicarious obligations
on municipalities may support a narrow and crabbed reading of the
statute with respect to municipal defendants, the absence of any such
concern for private defendants counsels against a similarly narrow
97 Id at 435-36 & n 13 (holding that "a defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of
a criminal antitrust offense" but cautioning that its holding "leaves unchanged the general rule
that a civil violation can be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect").
98 Id at 437. See also Mobil Oil Corp v EPA, 871 F2d 149,153 (DC Cir 1989) (finding that
the EPA did not err by interpreting the term "facility" in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act "to mean different things in different contexts"). Similarly, statutes containing both
remedial and penal provisions may be construed narrowly in the penal context but broadly in the
remedial context. See Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 60:4 at 304-05 (West 7th ed 2008).
99 Briscoe v LaHue, 460 US 325, 330 (1983) (holding that the phrase "every person" acting
under color of state law did not include police officers testifying in a judicial proceeding).
100Similarly, the Court has had little problem interpreting § 1983 differently for different
parties in the immunity context. Although the immunity defense does not arise from § 1983's text
in the same way as does Monell's conclusion about respondeat superior liability, see Wyatt v
Cole, 504 US 158, 163 (1992) ("Section 1983 creates a species of tort liability that on its face
admits of no immunities.") (quotation marks omitted), the Court has interpreted a single unitary
statute to incorporate different forms of immunity for different parties. See generally, for example, Richardson,521 US 399 (finding no qualified immunity for privately employed correctional
officers); Briscoe, 460 US 325 (providing absolute immunity for in-court witnesses); Harlow v
Fitzgerald,457 US 800 (1982) (allowing qualified immunity for government employees); Owen,
445 US at 622 (finding no immunity for a municipality); Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547 (1967) (allowing absolute immunity from damages for judges); Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367 (1951) (providing absolute immunity for legislators).
101 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trade
Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988). See also Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional
Questions Promote JudicialIndependence?, 56 Case W Res L Rev 1031, 1037 (2006) ("The canon
is a tool used by courts to interpret statutes narrowly when they raise 'serious constitutional
questions."') (citation omitted).
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reading and in favor of an interpretation consistent with the default
common law principle of respondeat superior liability. ' In other
words, perhaps Monell's interpretation of § 1983 should not be perceived as the natural or general reading of the statute that as a default
should be extended to other contexts, but instead as a specific interpretation designed to address a specific constitutional difficulty and
which therefore should be treated as an exception to the general rule
that defendants should be vicariously liable under § 1983 just as they
are for all other torts.
B.

Reexamining Congressional Intent Regarding Private Entities

Since the legislative history of the Sherman Amendment reveals
that Congress's concerns about vicarious liability were specific to public
entities, there is a question as to what Congress intended with respect to
private parties. This may be an unfair question, since it is not clear that
Congress anticipated that private parties would be covered by § 1983.03
But courts often must try to determine rules that are consistent with
congressional goals when faced with questions that Congress never explicitly contemplated. ' Here, some clues exist that support interpreting
§ 1983 to encompass private-entity respondeat superior liability.
First, as previously explained, Congress intended to incorporate existing common law tort rules into § 1983 absent clear evidence to the
contrary. Therefore, the default assumption should be that Congress
would have included respondeat superior liability for private parties.
Second, the legislative debates make clear that Congress believed
that § 1983 should be construed liberally in order to vindicate the sta-

102 Furthermore, given the general scholarly consensus that Monell's analysis of respondeat
superior liability is substantially flawed, it makes little sense to extend that faulty reasoning to
contexts where it does not necessarily control. Instead, it would be wiser to limit the reach of that
decision to its facts, which the Supreme Court often does with questionable decisions that it is
reluctant to overturn. See, for example, Hein v Freedom from Religion FoundationInc, 127 S Ct
2553,2568-69 (2007) (confining the scope of Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83 (1968), regarding taxpayer
standing); United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259, 291 (1990) (Brennan dissenting) (providing examples of cases that were subsequently confined to their facts).
103 Whether the legislative history of the 1871 Civil Rights Act evinces any congressional
intent to subject private entities performing public functions to § 1983 is beyond the scope of this
Article. Other parts of the 1871 Act, however, explicitly apply to private parties. See 42 USC
§ 1985 (making it illegal for two or more persons to conspire to deprive an individual of his or
her civil rights or of equal protection of the laws).
104 See Vermilya-Brown Co v Connell, 335 US 377, 388 (1948) (stating that the Court's role
is to determine what Congress "would have done had they acted at the time of the legislation
with the present situation in mind").
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tute's broad remedial purposes." A broad construction of the statute
would support incorporating, rather than eliminating, the doctrine of
respondeat superior.
Third, the fact that §§ 1981 and 1982-which were enacted just a
few years before § 1983 and which have been interpreted to cover
private parties'o'-subject private defendants to respondeat superior
liability supports the conclusion that private entities also should be
subject to respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Sections 1981
and 1982 were enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,"' which,
like the Civil Rights Act of 1871'°' (the Act containing § 1983), was
adopted to protect the rights of slaves newly freed after the Civil War.

Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcement
of contracts, and § 1982 prohibits discrimination in real estate transactions.O Private parties face respondeat superior liability under those

two statutes."" Furthermore, although the question has been rarely
addressed, some courts have held that § 1985, which was part of the
1871 Act and which explicitly applies to private parties, incorporates
traditional rules of respondeat superior liability."'
105 See, for example, Cong Globe App, 42d Cong, 1st Sess 68 (Mar 28, 1871) (statement of
Rep Shellabarger) (stating § 1983 should be "liberally and beneficently construed" because it is
"remedial and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights"); id at 217 (Apr 13,
1871) (statement of Sen Thurman) (stating that § 1983's language is without limit and "as broad
as can be used"). See also Monell,436 US at 686.
106 See generally Runyon v McCrary, 427 US 160 (1976) (holding that § 1981 applies to private parties); Jones v Mayer, 392 US 409 (1968) (holding that § 1982 applies to private parties).
107 Civil Rights Act of 1866,14 Stat 27 (1866), codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 1981-82.
108 Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 Stat 13 (1871), codified as amended at 42 USC § 1983.
10942 USC §§ 1981-1982.
110 See, for example, Arguello v Conoco,Inc, 207 F3d 803,809-12 (5th Cir 2000); Fitzgerald
v Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co,68 F3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir 1995); City of Chicago
v Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center,982 F2d 1086,1096 (7th Cir 1992); Vance v Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co, 863 F2d 1503, 1512 (11th Cir 1989); Hunter v Allis-Chalmers Corp,
797 F2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir 1986); Mitchell v Keith, 752 F2d 385, 388-89 (9th Cir 1985). See also
Harold S. Lewis, Jr, and Elizabeth J. Norman, Civil Rights Law & Practice§ 1.2 at 8-9 & n 36
(West 2d ed 2004) ("When a customer complains of racial discrimination by an employee of a
retailer [under § 1981], the employer can be held vicariously liable for the acts of the employee if
the employee was acting within the scope of the employment."). Consider General Building
ContractorsAssociation, Inc v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 395 (1982) (assuming without deciding
that "respondeat superior applies to suits based on § 1981"). Municipalities, by contrast, are
exempt from respondeat superior liability under § 1981. See Jettv Dallas Independent School
District,491 US 701,738 (1989).
M See, for example, Scott v Ross, 140 F3d 1275, 1283-84 (9th Cir 1998) (finding that private
§ 1985 defendant could be held liable under "traditional principles of respondeat superior"). See
also Bowen v Rubin, 385 F Supp 2d 168, 176-77 n 2 (EDNY 2005) (questioning whether Monell
should extend to private § 1985 defendants). In cases where courts have refused to impose respondeat superior liability under § 1985, the defendants have been government actors rather than
private actors. See, for example, Swint v City of Wadley, 5 F3d 1435, 1451 (11th Cir 1993).
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Although §§ 1981 and 1982 were part of a different statute and
use different statutory language than § 1983, the 1866 Act was passed
just five years before the enactment of § 1983, and it is generally understood that the collection of post-Civil War civil rights statutes
"were all products of the same milieu and were directed against the
same evils."11 2 The fact that § 1983 was expressly modeled on § 2 of the
1866 Act and was designed to carry out the 1866 Act's purposes further bolsters the notion that §§ 1981 and 1982 can inform the meaning
of § 1983. ' To be sure, §§ 1981 and 1982 apply only to very limited
torts whereas § 1983 creates a remedy that covers all federally protected fights. But it is hard to believe, especially given § 1983's broad
remedial purpose, that Congress would have wanted to impose a more
restrictive remedy for constitutionaltorts, arguably the most egregious
type of tort, than for §§ 1981 and 1982. 114 Thus, Congress's willingness
to impose respondeat superior liability on private parties in the other
contemporaneous post-Civil War Acts suggests that it likely would
have intended the same result under § 1983.15
GeneralBuilding Contractors,458 US at 391.
The original § 2 of the 1866 Act, which is now codified at 18 USC § 242, was the forerunner of § 1983. Jett, 491 US at 724 ("[TIhe first section of the 1871 Act was explicitly modeled on
§ 2 of the 1866 Act, and was seen by both opponents and proponents as amending and enhancing
the protections of the 1866 Act by providing a new civil remedy for its enforcement against state
actors."). Section 1983 was characterized as "carrying out the principles of the [1866] civil rights
bill." Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess 568 (Apr 11, 1871) (statement of Sen Edmunds). To be sure,
§ 2 of the 1866 Act differed from the portion of the 1866 Act that became § 1981. Section 2 imposed criminal liability on state actors who "willfully" violated federally protected rights on
account of the victim's race, color, or status as a former slave. Cong Globe App, 42d Cong, 1st
Sess 68 (Mar 28, 1871) (statement of Rep Shellabarger). Given the criminal nature of § 2, vicarious damages liability would not have been an issue, though corporations generally can be held
criminally liable for their employees' misconduct. See New York Central and Hudson River
Railroad Co v United States, 212 US 481,492-96 (1909) (upholding liability against a corporation
whose employee violated a law against providing rebates). However, Congress's willingness to
impose vicarious liability on private parties in other sections of the 1866 Act, combined with the
fact that § 1983 was perceived as expanding the reach of federal civil remedies, see Jett, 491 US at
724-25, supports the conclusion that Congress would have intended to make private parties
subject to respondeat superior liability under § 1983.
114 Several scholars have questioned whether Congress truly intended for 88 1981 and 1982
to apply to private parties or whether that doctrine instead was a product of the Supreme
Court's views in the 1960s and 1970s on racial equality. See, for example, Charles Fairman, 6
History of the Supreme Court of the United States:Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-68 1248-58
(Macmillan 1971); Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Maze, 1968 S Ct
Rev 89, 99-108 (1968). Even if that is the case, the fact that Congress may have wanted the civil
rights statutes to be interpreted together suggests that if the Supreme Court decided to expose
private parties to respondeat superior under §§ 1981 and 1982, then it should do the same for
private parties subject to § 1983.
115 To be sure, §§ 1981 and 1982 were enacted to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment whereas § 1983 was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See District of Columbia v
112
113
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The statutory and legislative history justifications for interpreting
§ 1983 to prohibit municipal respondeat superior liability do not apply
to private entities. As a doctrinal matter, the prevailing view that private parties acting under color of state law should be exempt from
respondeat superior liability is unfounded. The next Part examines

whether policy reasons support imposing respondeat superior liability
on private parties even if municipalities remain exempt.
III. PRIVATE ENTITIES VERSUS PUBLIC ENTITIES

If Monell does not support extending respondeat superior liabili-

ty to private parties, the next question is whether private entities subject to § 1983 should be exposed to respondeat superior liability as a
policy matter. This question is important not only because privatization is increasing, but also because many privatized functions involve
services where employees are frequently interacting with individu-

als- such as operating prisons, administering welfare benefits, or providing health care, as opposed to digging ditches-in ways that give

rise to numerous opportunities to violate constitutional rights..
Although lower courts have not been explicit, the primary policy
justification for exempting private entities from respondeat superior
liability appears to be one of symmetry. If private entities are subject
to § 1983 only because they agree to take on governmental duties,
then they should receive the same protections afforded to govern-

ments. Similarly, individuals who receive government services should
not have different rights based solely on whether the service is provided by the government or by a private contractor.
While this may seem like an appealing justification, symmetry
standing alone, is not the proper lens for analyzing whether private
entities should be exempt from § 1983 respondeat superior liability.
Initially, symmetry concerns traditionally have not been given disposiCarter, 409 US 418, 423 (1973). Thus, the provisions are not always treated the same way. See, for
example, Briscoe, 460 US at 341 n 26; Carter, 409 US at 421-24. But see Briscoe,460 US at 356-63
(Marshall dissenting) (arguing that the 1866 Civil Rights Act should guide interpretation of
§ 1983). In other instances, however, the Court has looked at one statute when interpreting the
other. See, for example, Quern v Jordan, 440 US 332, 341 n 11 (1979) (refusing to look to the
Dictionary Act to interpret § 1983, even though the Dictionary Act was enacted prior to § 1983,
on the ground that the Dictionary Act "came more than five years after passage of § 2 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, which served as the model for the language of § 1 of the
1871 Act"); Brief for International City Management Association, et al, as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Jett v Dallas Independent School District, Nos 87-2084,88-214, *11 (filed
Feb 3, 1989) (available on Westlaw at 1989 WL 1128162) (providing examples). Here, in the
absence of any specific reason for interpreting §§ 1981 and 1982 differently, they should be considered relevant to whether § 1983 encompasses respondeat superior liability for private parties.

2009]

Regulating Privatized Government through § 1983

1475

tive weight in devising liability rules under the statute. For example, in
Richardson v McKnight,"' the Supreme Court held that private correctional officers, unlike state correctional officers, are not entitled to
qualified immunity even though the two groups perform the same
duties."7 Similarly, private contractors are treated asymmetrically
based on whether they contract with state and local governments or
with the federal government. An individual subjected to constitutional
violations by a private entity contracting with the federal government
cannot pursue a Bivens action"8 against that entity, while an individual
who suffers constitutional injury by an entity contracting with a state
or local government can pursue a § 1983 action."9
Rather than reflexively applying a single rule to all parties, the Supreme Court has looked to the policy rationale underlying the particular liability rule and decided whether that rationale supported extending the rule to different defendants.12 In Richardson,for example, the
Court emphasized that marketplace incentives applicable to private
parties reduced the need for qualified immunity.'2' Whereas qualified
immunity for public employees is seen as necessary to prevent employees from being unduly timid and to not deter qualified employees
from entering public service, the Court stated that private employees
have adequate incentives to be vigilant on the job because (1) those who
are too timid risk being replaced by more effective employees, and
(2) private employers can offer insurance and other market-based incentive programs that will encourage individuals to apply for jobs.",
More importantly, symmetry is an inherently malleable concept.
How one perceives symmetry really just depends on one's starting
point. If the starting point is Monell, then imposing respondeat superior liability creates an asymmetry between public and private § 1983
defendants. But if the starting point is tort law in general, then impos521 US 399 (1997).
Id at 412. In fact, the Supreme Court repeatedly has been willing to impose different
immunity protections on different types of § 1983 defendants. See note 100.
118 Section 1983 provides a cause of action against individuals acting under color of state
law. In Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388
(1971), the Supreme Court established a similar cause of action for constitutional violations by
federal officers. See id at 397.
119 See CorrectionalServices Corp v Malesko, 534 US 61, 74 (2001) (refusing to permit a
Bivens cause of action against a private contractor with the federal government).
120 See, for example, Richardson, 521 US at 407-13 (focusing on the differences between
public and private employees in deciding not to extend qualified immunity to private employees
acting under color of state law).
121 Id at 409-11.
122 See id.
116
117
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ing respondeat superior liability resolves an asymmetry. Currently,
private entities are subject to respondeat superior liability in all
spheres of tort law except one -constitutional torts." From that perspective, the current rule is anomalous because it imposes more restrictive remedies for constitutional torts than for ordinary torts. 4
Instead of focusing on symmetry standing alone, a better framework would be to attempt to determine whether symmetrical treatment best furthers § 1983's purposes of deterring constitutional violations and compensating the victims of constitutional injury.12 If imposing respondeat superior liability will be more effective in deterring
private entities from violating constitutional rights than it will in deterring public entities, then society may prefer to treat private and
public entities differently, even when they perform the same function.
This Part attempts to discern whether differences exist in how the risk
of tort damages liability as well as other noneconomic factors, such as
the risk of negative publicity, influence private and public entities, and
whether, if such differences exist, they favor subjecting private § 1983
defendants to respondeat superior liability.
Against this backdrop, this Article suggests three reasons why
private party respondeat superior liability is more likely than municipal respondeat superior liability to further § 1983's purposes. First,
damages remedies provided through the tort system, including respondeat superior remedies, are more likely to deter wealthmaximizing private firms than less financially driven governmental
entities from violating rights.' Second, damages remedies, such as respondeat superior, may be less necessary for deterring government
misconduct because governmental entities are subject to other noneconomic forms of accountability -such as elections and open records
laws-that do not apply as strongly to private parties. ' Third, governments may be more likely than private parties to respond to damages liability not by reforming the agencies causing the misconduct,
Consider Dobbs, The Law of Torts at 905 & n 1 (cited in note 23).
See Taylor v Plousis, 101 F Supp 2d 255,263--64 n 4 (D NJ 2000) ("It seems odd that the
more serious conduct necessary to prove a constitutional violation would not impose corporate
liability when a lesser misconduct under state law would impose corporate liability."). See also
Smith v Wade, 461 US 30,48-49 (1983) ("As a general matter, we discern no reason why a person
whose federally guaranteed rights have been violated should be granted a more restrictive remedy than a person asserting an ordinary tort cause of action.").
125 See, for example, Owen v City of Independence, Missouri, 445 US 622, 651 (1980)
("Moreover, § 1983 was intended not only to provide compensation to the victims of past abuses,
but to serve as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations as well.").
123
124

126
127

See Part III.A.
See Part III.B.
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but instead by cutting other programs that may provide important and

useful services. In other words, an asymmetrical starting pointdifferent respondeat superior rules for private and public entitiesmay actually increase symmetry at the end point of protecting constitutional rights.
This is not to suggest that private entities respond to only one set

of incentives and that governmental entities respond to an entirely
distinct set of incentives. Municipal entities to some degree will be
concerned with the financial impact of damages awards, and private
entities will be concerned about negative public opinion. What this

Article does suggest, however, is that the degree to which these factors
affect public and private behavior differs, and that at the very least,

courts should account for those differences in evaluating whether
Monell should apply to private entities rather than reflexively extending Monell as they typically have done.
A. Respondeat Superior Liability and Deterrence
1. Private entity response to respondeat superior liability.
One basic and longstanding assumption of modern tort law is that
employers should be liable for the torts of their employees committed
within the scope of employment and that holding employers liable will

promote deterrence objectives. Conventional economic theory treats
private firms as rational profit-maximizers. '29Private firms aim to minimize marginal costs, and one such cost is tort liability. Therefore, if
private firms are subject to liability for certain actions, they likely will
attempt to minimize those actions, or at least the parts giving rise to
liability.n Although tort liability does not operate as a perfect deter128 See Part III.C.
129 See, for example, Michael J. Trebilcock and Edward M. lacobucci, Privatization and
Accountability, 116 Harv L Rev 1422,1424 (2003) ("Private firms organize themselves to maximize profits.").
130 See, for example, Kritchevsky, 26 Cardozo L Rev at 79 (cited in note 32) ("Private actors,
however, are likely to react to financial incentives and to avoid actions that will lead to liability."); Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1394 (cited in note 11) (noting that damages liability helps
keep private companies accountable for their actions); Kramer and Sykes, 1987 S Ct Rev at 267
(cited in note 70) ("[L]iability rules create incentives to take precautions against accidental
injuries and stand as a deterrent to intentional harms."). Additionally, tort liability can affect a
company's stock price, which provides further incentive to take measures to avoid liability. See
Note, Developments in the Law: The Law of Prison, 115 Harv L Rev 1838, 1884 (2002). In previous § 1983 decisions, the Supreme Court has relied on the proposition that private parties
respond to tort liability incentives. See, for example, Richardson,521 US at 412 (concluding that
marketplace pressures "help private firms adjust their behavior in response to the incentives that

1478

The University of Chicago Law Review

[76:1449

rent and although some scholars have questioned how effectively tort

liability deters misbehavior, tort liability generally is regarded as an
important mechanism for promoting accountability and encouraging
private entities to abide by the law. '

In a Coasean world with zero transaction costs, a respondeat superior rule would have no effect on efficiency because the employer
and employee would efficiently allocate risk between them regardless
of the default legal rule."2 Essentially, if respondeat superior is an effi-

cient rule, then employers would privately agree to indemnify their
employees for violations committed within the scope of employment.
However, because of some important differences between entities and
employees, conventional tort theory nonetheless recognizes that respondeat superior liability can promote deterrence in33 ways that simply
placing liability on the individual tortfeasor cannot.
First, respondeat superior can promote more efficient deterrence
where, as is the case in many § 1983 actions, the individual employee
lacks the resources to pay a damages award. As Professor Alan Sykes
has demonstrated, employee insolvency encourages both the employer and the employee to underinvest in deterrence measures because it

is cheaper for the employer and employee to engage in collusive sidepayments that would cover the fraction of the damages award that the
tort suits provide"); CorrectionalServices Corp, 534 US at 71 (acknowledging that it "may be"
that "requiring payment [by private entities] for the constitutional harms they commit is the best
way to discourage future harms" but refusing, on other grounds, to find that private parties are
subject to Bivens actions).
131 See generally Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis ofAccident Law (Harvard 1987) (discussing, through an economic analysis, how liability alters behavior); Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (Yale 1970). Not everyone agrees that tort liability is an effective deterrent in the private
sector. See, for example, Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L Rev 785, 817-19 (1990)
(arguing that tort law individualizes victims while collectivizing tortfeasors, distributing the impact
of lawsuits while simultaneously encouraging paying off individuals who are harmed rather than
engaging in collective actions to change the practices of tortfeasors); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing
Away with Tort Law, 73 Cal L Rev 555,564-73 (1985) (describing how tort law can be an ineffective
deterrent). See also generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L Rev 377 (1994) (questioning whether tort liability serves as a
"strong" deterrent but concluding that liability still performs a deterrence function).
132 See Jennifer H. Arlen and William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U IlI L Rev 691, 706 (applying Coasean principles in the
context of respondeat superior liability). See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J L & Econ 1 (1960).
133 A number of scholars have provided a theoretical basis for the doctrine of respondeat
superior liability. See, for example, Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 170-75 (cited
in note 131); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law
120-21 (Harvard 1987); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L J 1231,
1961-79 (1984); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice between Enterprise
and Personal Liabilityfor Accidents, 70 Cal L Rev 1345,1351-52 (1982).
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employee can afford to pay.'3 Respondeat superior can correct that
problem by placing liability on the employer, who is more likely to
possess sufficient resources to satisfy the judgment. '35
Similarly, respondeat superior liability promotes efficiency where
employees have certain defenses to liability, such as immunity, that
entity-defendants do not have. In the § 1983 context, private individual defendants, but not private entities, often can claim immunity if they
136
acted in good faith. Immunity creates the same incentive for the employer and employee to engage in side payments rather than to contract for respondeat superior liability.
Second, even without such direct incentives, aligning the employer's profit with respect for constitutional rights may indirectly affect
employee behavior. In many cases, employers are better equipped
than courts to monitor their employees' behavior, meaning that employees will be more responsive to the risk of an employer sanction
than to the risk of a tort judgment. "7 Similarly, employees naturally
may want to help a firm maximize profits in order to assure job security and the employee's place within the firm. Because employees may
be more immediately concerned with pleasing their bosses than with
the abstract risk of a tort lawsuit at some future point, making employers accountable for the violations of their employees may be a
better inducement for employees to respect constitutional rights than
placing tort liability on the employee alone.
Third, the employing entity is best able to put liability avoidance
measures in place that will encourage all employees to try to minimize
tortious conduct. Entity liability creates incentives for employers to
hire more qualified employees who are less prone to commit misconduct and to invest in employee training to reduce the risk of on-the-job
misconduct."O Employers also can offer incentives, such as bonuses or

134 See Sykes, 93 Yale L J at 1241-52 (cited in note 133).

See id.
See Part IV.A.
137 Consider Kornhauser, 70 Cal L Rev at 1377 (cited in note 133).
138 Consider Trebilcock and lacobucci, 116 Harv L Rev at 1435 (cited in note 129) ("Private
organizations are generally more effective than governments in motivating agents to act in ways
that maximize a firm's profits and value.").
139 See Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 334 at 908 (cited in note 23); Harper, James, and Gray, 5
Harper James and Gray on Torts § 26.1 at 9 (cited in note 33).
140 Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 173 (cited in note 131); Posner, 1 J Legal
Stud at 43 (cited in note 33); Sykes, 93 Yale L J at 1251 (cited in note 133) ("Alternatively, vicarious liability may lead to the employment of more financially responsible agents with an attendant increase in loss-avoidance effort.").
135
136
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stock option plans for employees who respect constitutional rights, as
well as penalties for those whose behavior puts those rights at risk."'
Nondeterrence grounds also provide justification for respondeat
superior liability. One longstanding rationale is fairness: a business
that enjoys the profits of its employees' labor also should accept the

burdens of its employees' job-related misconduct. 2 Additionally, firms
generally are better risk-bearers than their employees because they

can purchase insurance more efficiently than employees (who would
each have to purchase insurance separately). 3 and can spread the costs
of liability across the entire firm (as well as its customers) rather than
concentrating all of the risk on a single employee.'" Also, shifting liability to the employer increases the likelihood that injured plaintiffs
will receive full compensation, as there will be some cases in which an
employee will be immune
or will be judgment proof and not indemni4
fied by the employer. 1
Even if employers and employees do bargain for the employer to
assume the employee's liability risk through indemnification, indemnification is unlikely to deter misconduct as effectively as respondeat
superior liability because employees can claim immunity for good
faith actions and because bad faith actions often fall outside the scope
of indemnification provisions. 46
To be sure, the deterrent effect of respondeat superior liability is
limited, as the employer will invest in liability prevention measures
only up to the point that the cost of prevention exceeds the expected

cost of liability. ' But the rule still provides for greater deterrence than
Sykes, 93 Yale L J at 1237 (cited in note 133).
See Restatement (Second) Agency § 219, comment a at 483 (ALI 1958) ("[Ilt would be
unjust to permit an employer to gain from the intelligent cooperation of others without being
responsible for the mistakes, the errors of judgment, and the frailties of those working under his
direction and for his benefit."); Achtenberg, 73 Fordham L Rev at 2202 (cited in note 30) (stating
that a "prominent nineteenth-century justification for respondeat superior was the concept that
...those who hope to profit from an activity also must bear its costs"); Beermann, 48 DePaul L
Rev at 646 (cited in note 72) (noting that it is "fair to hold employers liable" for the torts of
employees because employers are the beneficiaries of their employees work).
143 See Sykes, 93 Yale L J at 1236 (cited in note 133); Kramer and Sykes, 1987 S Ct Rev at
268 (cited in note 70).
144 See Harper, James, and Gray, 5 Harper,James and Gray on Torts § 26.1 at 8 & n 17 (cited
in note 33); Mead, 65 NC L Rev at 539-40 (cited in note 62); George D. Brown, MunicipalLiability under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism:A Comment on City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The "Official Policy" Cases, 27 BC L
Rev 883, 893-94 (1986).
145 See Beermann, 48 DePaul L Rev at 646 (cited in note 72); Kramer and Sykes, 1987 S Ct
Rev at 277-78 (cited in note 70).
146 See Part IV.A.
147 See Posner, 1 J Legal Stud at 42-43 (cited in note 33).
141
142
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placing liability on the individual alone. And although a small number of scholars question how strongly respondeat superior liability

deters future torts, "9 many scholarly criticisms of vicarious liability do
not question the underlying doctrine, but instead question its application to discrete areas of law."
Thus, conventional tort theory provides several reasons for imposing respondeat superior liability on private § 1983 defendants. The

fact that private entities may perform public functions does not
change this analysis. Even when performing public functions or acting
in concert with the government, private entities are still profit motivated and still sensitive to tort liability risks. In fact, respondeat superior may be an especially effective deterrent in the arena of public

functions because poor employee training and retention can be a particular problem for certain privatized government services. Private
prisons provide a good example. Labor accounts for as much as

148 The fact that employers may not pay liability judgments directly but instead may obtain
liability insurance does not undermine the efficiency benefits of respondeat superior liability.
Initially, many governmental and private entities-including private entities that perform core
public functions-self-insure. See Corrections Corporation of America, Corrections Corporation
of America 2004 Annual Report 74 (stating that CCA is "subject to substantial self-insurance
risk" for ongoing litigation); Susan A. MacManus and Patricia A. Turner, Litigation as a Budgetary Constraint:Problem Areas and Costs, 53 Pub Admin Rev 462,468 (1993) (indicating that many
cities and counties have shifted to self-insurance as insurance costs have risen); Gary T. Schwartz,
The Ethics and Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 Cornell L Rev 313, 315 (1990) (noting
that many defendants are "self-insured"). If insurance is thought to promote effective deterrence, insurance likely will still underdeter in the absence of respondeat superior liability. To the
extent that insurance premiums are tied to behavior that exposes an employer to liability, those
premiums will not encourage employers to take action to reduce the risk of employee misconduct if the employers are not on the hook for their employees' actions. If the concern is that
insurance will have the opposite effect-that is, that it will make entities non-responsive to liability risk because the insurance company is the one that pays out the judgment-that concern also
seems unfounded. Unless a company's insurance premiums are fiat, premiums would likely rise
in relation to the number of adverse judgments. See, for example, Schwartz, 75 Cornell L Rev at
326-33 (comparing flat and responsive insurance). Additionally, insurance may actually improve
deterrence because insurance premiums rise and fall based on how an entity behaves in order to
minimize risk whereas legal liability only deters in cases where a plaintiff files suit and prevails
either through judgment or settlement.
149 Consider Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and FundamentalIssue of Employer Vicarious
Liability, 69 S Cal L Rev 1739,1755--64 (1996) (critiquing various deterrence rationales for vicarious liability but nonetheless concluding that vicarious liability can further deterrence objectives
in certain circumstances). For an attack on vicarious liability as nothing more than an effort to
reach "deep pocket[s]," see T. Baty, Vicarious Liability 146-54 (Oxford 1916).
150 See generally Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and PersonalLiability for Employment
Discrimination, 30 Ga L Rev 509 (1996) (addressing arguments for restricting vicarious liability
in hostile work environment sexual harassment cases); Arlen and Carney, 1992 U III L Rev 691
(cited in note 132) (arguing against imposing vicarious liability in "fraud on the market" cases).
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70 percent of the cost of operating a prison. 5' Consequently, reducing
labor costs is an easy way for a private prison to boost profits.' Private prison companies have attempted to lower their costs by reducing both wages"' and staffing levels."' The result of lower wages is

greater employee turnover-one report stated that the average employment duration for Corrections Corporation of America employees was a scant three months"'-meaning that employees have

less experience, receive less training, may feel less job satisfaction, and
may invest less in their jobs or show less concern about performing

well. " ' All of these factors increase the risk that employees will be less

prepared to handle difficult situations from which constitutional violations are likely to arise. 7 One study concluded that private prisons

151 See Austin and Coventry, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons at 16 (cited in note 13);
John Donohue, Prisonsfor Profit: PublicJustice,PrivateInterests 14 & n 55 (Economic Policy Institute 1988), online at http://epi.3cdn.net/e6e28612a19ac589e8_ozm6ibbye.pdf (visited Aug 9, 2009);
Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons,55 Duke L J 437,475 & n 134 (2005) (citing
sources indicating that two-thirds or more of a private prison's budget goes to labor costs).
152 See Dolovich, 55 Duke L J at 475-76 & n 138 (cited in note 151) (stating that private
prison officials view cutting costs of employee staffing and training as essential for maintaining
profitability); Note, 115 Harv L Rev at 1879 (cited in note 131) (stating that in general, private
companies' "main savings come from reducing labor costs"); Austin and Coventry, Emerging
Issues on Privatized Prisonsat 16 (cited in note 151) (stating that private prisons claim to save 10
to 20 percent in expenses with "efficient handling of labor costs").
153 See Judith Greene, Bailing out Private Jails,Am Prospect 23, 25 (Sept 10, 2001) (asserting that private prisons offer "wages and benefits [that are] substantially lower than those in
government-run prisons"). Margaret Talbot, a reporter who investigated private detention facilities, cites one report concluding that private detention facilities "offer significantly lower salaries
than public state correctional agencies," as well as an internal federal government memo detailing that the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the nation's largest private prison
operator, pays new employees almost 30 percent less than county prison employees. See Talbot,
The Lost Children,New Yorker at 64 (cited in note 13).
154 See Austin and Coventry, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisonsat 52 (cited in note 13)
("[Tihe number of staff assigned to private facilities is approximately 15 percent lower than the
number of staff assigned to public facilities."); Talbot, The Lost Children,New Yorker at 66 (cited
in note 13) (citing a study concluding that private facilities offer "significantly lower staffing
levels" than public facilities); Aman, 14 Ind J Global Legal Stud at 310 (cited in note 14) (describing an investigation of a private prison healthcare company that showed frequent turnover
and poor training of the company's physicians). See also Carla Crowder, Sex Scandal Rattles
Private Prison,Rocky Mountain News A5 (Sept 26, 1999).
155 See Talbot, The Lost Children,New Yorker at 64 (cited in note 13).
156 For example, one provider of prison health care, Correctional Medical Services, has
hired a number of medical personnel with suspended or revoked medical licenses. See Andrew
Skolnick, Prison Deaths Spotlight How Boards Handle Impaired, Disciplined Physicians, 280
JAMA 1387,1387 (1998).
157 See, for example, Dolovich, 55 Duke L J at 461 & n 89 (cited in note 151) (providing
examples of abuse and mistreatment of private prison inmates that may have resulted from the
prison's focus on containing costs).
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had a higher rate of assaults and major disturbances," and a government report on misconduct at a privately run prison in Youngstown,
Ohio attributed many of the prison's problems to inadequate training
and experience. 09 Although the private prison industry is just one example, it suggests, consistent with the theoretical underpinnings for
respondeat superior liability, that private employers can reduce the
level of employee misconduct by investing in additional training and
offering better wages. The lack of a respondeat superior rule, however,
may reduce the employer's incentive to do so.
Of course, one could argue that respondeat superior is unneces-

sary to deter employer decisions to understaff and undertrain employees out of a desire to cut costs because those actions would satisfy
Monell's custom or policy standard. That may not be the case, howev-

er, for several reasons. First, many cases of inadequate training or hiring of employees will not satisfy the custom or policy standard, which
requires not just negligence, or even gross negligence, but a showing
that the employer was deliberately indifferent to the risk of a constitutional violation and that the violation was a "plainly obvious" conse-

quence of the employer's actions. '6 Second, even where the em-

ployee's misconduct might result from a custom or policy, actually
proving the existence of the custom or policy often is very difficult,
requiring significant additional discovery into the employer's know-

ledge, customs, and general practices. Documenting an illegal custom
158 See Austin and Coventry, Emerging Issues on PrivatizedPrisons at 52 (cited in note 13).
See also Talbot, The Lost Children, New Yorker at 66 (cited in note 13) (citing one study that
found a significantly higher assault rate at private prisons than at public prisons); Dolovich, 55
Duke L J at 483 (cited in note 151) (suggesting that "guards who are insufficiently trained may
well resort to force more readily than guards with adequate training and experience"). Although
it is difficult to obtain data on private prisons, let alone to conduct an adequate comparison between public and private prisons, Talbot relays that the authors of the study which found higher
assault rates stated that as a general matter, higher employee turnover rates correlate with higher
violence. Talbot, The Lost Children,New Yorker at 66 (cited in note 13). See also Dolovich, 55 Duke
L J at 502 (cited in note 151) ("[M]eaningful data do exist showing elevated levels of physical violence in private prisons."); Ken Kolker, CriticsNot Convinced Youth Prisonis Fixed, Grand Rapids
Press Al (Aug 24, 2000) (reporting that a privately run juvenile prison, as a result of understaffmg,
experienced more violence than an adult maximum security prison in the same state).
159 See John L. Clark, Office of the Corrections Trustee, Report to the Attorney General: Inspection and Review of the Northeast Ohio CorrectionalCenter 7 (Nov 25,1998) (noting "the lack of
correctional experience on the part of all staff especially supervisors" who were "not yet sufficiently
at
online
duties"),
their
for
trained
or
experienced
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/youngstown/youngstown.htm (visited Aug 9, 2009). See also Austin and
Coventry, Emerging Issues on PrivatizedPrisonsat 59 (cited in note 13) (noting that "inexperienced
staff" and "inadequate training" of staff contributed to the problems at the Youngstown, Ohio
prison); Dolovich, 55 Duke L J at 461 (cited in note 151) (describing inmate abuse at Youngstown).
160 See notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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or policy is not easy, especially considering that in many cases the custom may take the form of informal, tacit "unwritten rules" rather than
an easily identified, explicit policy. Third, even where there is an unlawful custom, the governmental entity, rather than the private entity,
may be considered the final policymaker as long as it retains some
oversight authority, which effectively lets the private entity off the
hook."' When privatization occurs at the state level, this means that
the plaintiff cannot recover damages at all because the state has immunity from damages. Finally, the custom or policy standard itself has
been criticized as ill-defined and expensive to litigate.' The scope-of-

employment standard, by contrast, provides better notice to employers about when they will be liable for employee misconduct. ' 6 Greater
predictability leads to greater efficiency by enabling employers to or-

der their behavior in advance.
At bottom, given both the general view that respondeat superior
can promote deterrence and the fact that respondeat superior is a
foundational part of the tort system, imposing respondeat superior
liability on private parties subject to § 1983 likely would further the
statute's purposes by reducing constitutional violations.
2. Public entity response to respondeat superior liability.
Although respondeat superior may work well in the private sec-

tor, it is much less clear that it will effectively deter public entities
from violating constitutional rights. How damages judgments affect
government actors is not as well understood as how they affect private
actors. This is because unlike a private firm, a government's primary
161 See, for example, Austin v ParamountParks, Inc, 195 F3d 715, 729-30 (4th Cir 1999)
(finding that a private defendant was not a final policymaker); Howell v Evans, 922 F2d 712,725
(11th Cir 1991) (finding that prison healthcare provider was not a final policymaker because its
decisions were subject to state review); Hicks v Frey, 992 F2d 1450,1458 (6th Cir 1993) (same).
162 See Schuck, 77 Georgetown L J at 1781 (cited in note 70) ("[T]he indeterminacy of the
existing 'official policy' limitation is surely a source of wasteful litigation."). Consider Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw U L Rev 503, 548-49 (1985), citing Thomas G.

Quinnt, State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure, 64 Cal L Rev 146, 155-56 (1978) (sug-

gesting that abolishing the state action doctrine could reduce litigation costs because the incoherence of the existing state action doctrine forces litigants to try and create finer and finer distinctions in the boundary between state action and private action).
163 Courts have many more opportunities to define the scope of employment standard,
which applies to virtually every private tort action involving a business defendant, than the custom or policy standard, which applies only in § 1983 actions and only to municipal defendants.
Moreover, the custom or policy standard is only thirty years old, whereas courts have been defining scope of employment since the nineteenth century. See also Michael J.Gerhardt, Institutional
Analysis of Municipal Liability under Section 1983,48 DePaul L Rev 669,682 (1999) (stating that

the respondeat superior rule is a "test that judges can easily understand and administer").
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motivation is not to maximize profit, but to provide public services. "
Because governments are not motivated primarily by profit, they may
be less likely than private firms to respond to tort liability incentives.

Several theories attempt to explain what motivates government
behavior in the absence of a strong profit motive. One common theory
is that government officials, like anyone else, are rational actors that
seek to maximize their self-interest. Elected officials, therefore, may

be motivated to "respond[] primarily to political incentives, not finan-

cial incentives," such as maximizing one's chance of reelection.'6 6 One
proponent of this theory is Professor Daryl Levinson, who has written
a series of articles asserting that a government's electoral incentives

do not always align with its financial incentives and that as a result

governments may not be responsive to damages awards. ' 6,For agency
officials, self-interest may mean maximizing their own individual

budgets or their jurisdictional authority.6' Agency officials will take

actions that demonstrate a need for more money and will avoid ac-

tions that tend to reduce the resources available for agency priorities.
164 David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial
Spirit is Transforming the Private Sector 198 (Addison-Wesley 1992); James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What PublicAgencies Do and Why They Do It 115 (Basic Books 1989) ("To a much greater extent than is true of private bureaucracies, government agencies ...cannot lawfully retain
and devote to the benefit of their members the earnings of the organization."); Kramer and
Sykes, 1987 S Ct Rev at 278 (cited in note 70) ("With the possible exception of certain independent, proprietary governmental entities, however, municipal agencies are not usually motivated
by the desire to maximize profits.").
165 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-building Government in ConstitutionalLaw, 118 Harv L
Rev 915, 965-66 (2005) (arguing that government bureaucracies, which do not seek to maximize
profit, have little reason to be concerned with losing money to litigation judgments); Trebilcock and
lacobucci, 116 Harv L Rev at 1426-27 (cited in note 129) (noting that government will be less responsive than private enterprise to damage judgments due to differing incentive structures).
166 Levinson, 118 Harv L Rev at 966 (cited in note 165) (explaining that government officials care about damage awards only to the extent that the awards drain funds that would otherwise go to preferred political constituencies). See also Edward L. Rubin and Malcom M. Feeley,
Judicial Policy Making and Litigation against the Government, 5 U Pa J Const L 617, 621-22
(2003) (describing the public choice perspective, which holds that political actors are motivated
primarily by their desire to maintain the benefits of their status as influential policy agents);
David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 13-17 (Yale 1975) (arguing that the primary goal of members of congress is to be reelected).
167 See, for example, Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U Chi L Rev 345,347 (2000); Levinson, 118 Harv L Rev at
966 (cited in note 165). Levinson's articles have spawned significant debate regarding damages
and governmental deterrence. See notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
168 See William A. Niskanen, Jr, Bureaucracyand Representative Government 36-42 (Aldine
1971) ("Bureaucrats maximize the total budget of their bureau during their tenure."). See also
Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, ConstitutionalTorts,
and Takings, 9 U Pa J Const L 797, 844-47 (2007) (asserting that governmental entities seek to
avoid actions that will expose them to significant financial liabilities).
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Other models take a different approach. Some suggest that government actors seek to maximize public welfare, even at the expense
of their own.' Finally, some believe that governments do not behave
that much differently than private parties and that, like private parties,
they have an incentive to minimize the amount of litigation damages
they pay out.
Each of these models is consistent with the idea that damages
liability can deter misconduct. For the budget maximizer, a damages
judgment could exert a deterrent effect if the payout correspondingly
reduced the amount of money that the offending agency can devote to
other programs. For the electorally driven, damages could deter future
misconduct if the award angered the government's constituents. Indeed, some scholars point to the fact that states have universally
enacted tort immunity statutes as evidence that governments are sensitive to the risk of damages liability.7 '
What is important, however, is that whether or not governments
respond to damages awards, they do not respond in the same manner
as private parties. Unlike the clear economic incentive for private entities to maintain an efficient level of liability, the political incentives
facing government actors are muddier. For governments, reducing
damages awards is an instrumental concern designed to achieve some
other goal-reelection, agency power, or social welfare. As explained
below, because the relationship between reducing damages liability and
those other goals can become attenuated, it is possible that government
actors may not respond to tort liability as strongly as private actors.
First, although government agencies may want to maximize their
budgets, a disconnect can exist between the part of the government
bureaucracy responsible for the violation and the part that actually
169 Gillette and Stephan, 8 S Ct Econ Rev at 111 (cited in note 31); Ronald A. Cass and
Clayton P. Gillette, The Government ContractorDefense: ContractualAllocation of Public Risk,
77 Va L Rev 257,271 (1991). This model may sometimes lead to the same outcomes as the budget-maximizing model. "[G]overnmental officials generally believe that they are advancing the
public good by increasing the authority and responsibility of their agency, with an increase in the
budget and power of the agency as an accompanying consequence." Todd J. Zywicki, Institutional
Review Boards as Academic Bureaucracies:An Economic and ExperimentalAnalysis, 101 Nw U
L Rev 861,874 (2007).
170 See, for example, Harold J. Krent, PreservingDiscretion without Sacrificing Deterrence:
FederalGovernmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L Rev 871, 872 (1991) ("If the theory of tort
law is in part to compel private entities to become more efficient in light of potential tort liability, then there is no reason why potential liability should not similarly force the government to be
more prudent in its operations.").
171 See, for example, Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 841 (cited in note 168) ("Evidence that
tort liability exacts a political price by reducing political control over public resources is also
reflected in the pattern of immunity legislation.").
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pays the judgment. For some governmental entities, litigation payments do not come from the budget of the offending employee's
agency, but from a general litigation or judgment fund.'72 In such situations, damages liability imposes no direct punishment on the agency
whose employee committed the violation. Only if the government
connects the budgetary cost of litigation to the agency employing the
responsible party could there be any effect, but it is far from clear how

strong that connection is. '
Second, even if litigation judgments did come from the agency's
budget, the longer the time horizon is between when a violation occurs and when damages are paid out, the less likely it is that a judgment will affect government behavior. Section 1983 litigation can take
a long time from start to finish. Several years may pass before a lawsuit is even filed,"' and the complex nature of § 1983 litigation can add
several more years or even a decade to the life of a case. 5 By the con-

clusion of the lawsuit, the voting public may not associate the damages

172 See, for example, Daniel L. Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: The Next Generation of
Prison Management, 29 New Eng J on Crim & Civ Confinement 1, 41 (2003) (stating that lawsuits against federal prisons are paid out of a general judgment fund); Roderick M. Hills, Jr, The
Eleventh Amendment as Curb on BureaucraticPower, 53 Stan L Rev 1225, 1228 (2001) (stating
that some state governments, as well as the federal government, maintain separate judgment
funds to pay litigation damages and concluding that "damages judgments do not affect an agency's bottom line"). Some municipalities also appear to have general liability funds for satisfying
judgments. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 Geo
Wash L Rev 453,472-73 (2004) (noting that the city of Los Angeles paid out $79.2 million in civil
judgments from 1991-1995, that New York City paid out $70 million from 1994-1996, and that
the city of Chicago budgeted $30 million per year for payment of civil liability judgments). Indemnification practices, however, may mitigate this effect, since indemnification payments come
from the relevant agency's budget rather than from a general judgment fund. See Cass and
Gillette, 77 Va L Rev at 323 (cited in note 169).
173 See Hills, 53 Stan L Rev at 1246-47 (cited in note 172) (asserting that legislators do not
ordinarily respond to litigation judgments by cutting the offending agency's budget). In fact, in
some cases, litigation actually can result in increased budgets for particular agencies. See Armacost, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 475 (cited in note 172) (describing how police departments have
received budgetary increases in the face of lawsuits).
174 Potential plaintiffs typically have several years before the statute of limitations runs to
decide whether to file suit. Section 1983 borrows the statute of limitations from the law of the
relevant state, which typically is two or three years. See generally Daniel E. Feld, What Statute of
Limitations Is Applicable to Civil Rights Action Brought under 42 US.CA. § 1983,45 ALR Fed
548 (2008) (collecting statutes of limitations for different states).
175 For example, the DC Circuit issued a § 1983 decision in early 2008 concerning allegations of misconduct occurring from 1991-1997. See Brown v District of Columbia, 514 F3d 1279,
1281 (DC Cir 2008). Moreover, the issue on appeal was the grant of the defendant's motion to
dismiss, meaning that the case had not yet even proceeded to discovery, let alone summary
judgment or trial. See id. In Thompson v Connick, 553 F3d 836 (5th Cir 2008), the underlying
violation, a wrongful conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct, occurred in 1985 and the
Fifth Circuit did not affirm the jury's damage award until 2008. Id at 842-43.
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paid out with the underlying violation, and so there may be little electoral or budgetary consequence for failing to take corrective action.
At the time damages are actually paid, there may even be a different
administration in place from when the violation occurred. The officials
who have to respond to the judgment either by raising taxes, diverting
spending from other programs, or reorganizing agency budgets to pay
the judgment therefore may not be the ones whose employees committed the violations. 1 6 As a result, even assuming that voters do account for budgetary costs in their voting decisions, they would penalize the wrong administration. Tort liability likely will have less deterrent power if public officials know that there is a good chance that
neither they nor their agencies will be the ones to pay the price for the
actions of their employees.'n
Third, while politically accountable government entities may respond to litigation damages by addressing the conduct giving rise to
liability, they also may respond by making symbolic or superficial
changes designed to ' create the public appearance of addressing the
underlying problem. 78In other words, governments may find it more
effective to perpetuate bad behavior while conveying to the voting
public that it is correcting the problem. 9
Fourth, for financial penalties to translate into political accountability, voters must associate any pecuniary impact they feel with constitutional liability and choose to hold elected officials responsible as a
result. Whether this actually happens in practice is uncertain. Paying
civil liability damages affects voters either by leading to increased tax-

176 Recently, a newly elected district attorney in New Orleans was saddled with a $15 million jury award against the office for prosecutorial misconduct occurring more than twenty years
earlier. See Michael Kunzelman, D.A. Says $15M Ruling May Bankrupt New Orleans,Philadelphia Inquirer A9 (Jan 8, 2009). Consider Freeman, 116 Harv L Rev at 1326 (cited in note 12)
(asserting that the greater the distance between the electorate and the elected, the less effective
political accountability will be).
177 At the same time, long time horizons between violations and judgments also may affect
private entities. Publicly traded companies may act out of a short-term interest in boosting stock
prices, and if actions leading to civil rights violations create a short-term benefit but a greater
long-term harm, those companies might find it in their interest to tolerate the violations. To the
degree that long time horizons undermine the efficacy of tort incentives, however, they may have
less of an effect in the private sector than in the public sector. Even where private companies
have an interest in boosting short-term stock prices, litigation risks will affect stock prices and a
company that seeks short-term gain at the cost of elevating its risk of civil rights liability may
find that investors account for that risk in the present by driving down the stock price. See Note,
115 Harv L Rev at 1884 (cited in note 130).
178 Charles R. Epp, Litigation Stories: Official Perception of Lawsuits against Local Governments (unpublished presentation, 1998 Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Association).

179

See id.
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es or to reduced spending on other services. In many jurisdictions, the
cost of paying judgments, while perhaps significant in absolute terms,
may be marginal when spread across all taxpayers in the jurisdiction,
especially if the judgment represents only a small percentage of the
government's budget.' Consequently, voters may not connect marginally higher tax rates or marginally reduced spending with specific
constitutional violations rather than with myriad other government
decisions that affect taxes and spending. ' To the extent that the risk of
damages awards exerts some pressure on public officials to encourage
public employees to abide by the law, the attenuated relationship between damages payments and voter perceptions of elected officials
blunts that deterrent effect.
Moreover, even if government actors desire to reduce damages
liability, respondeat superior may do less than anticipated to help
them achieve that goal because many governments lack the flexibility
to take measures that reduce the risk of future employee misconduct.
Because of rigid civil service laws, governments often are less able
180 Damages awards against governmental entities can be significant in absolute terms. For
example, between 1994 and 1996, the city of New York paid out $70 million in awards in police
misconduct cases alone. Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 835 (cited in note 168); Armacost, 72
Geo Wash L Rev at 472-73 (cited in note 172). From a percentage perspective, however, evidence suggests that § 1983 judgments account for a tiny fraction of agency budgets. See Stewart J.
Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining ConstitutionalTort Litigation:The Influence of the
Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 Cornell L Rev 719, 736-39 (1988)
(finding in a study of three federal districts that § 1983 damages payouts accounted for
0.02 percent of government expenditures and cost thirty-five cents per taxpayer). This may be
less true at the municipality or county level, however, given that most municipalities and counties
will have smaller budgets than states. Some local government entities have asserted that civil
rights judgments exert a significant financial impact. See Kunzelman, D.A. Says $15M Ruling
May Bankrupt New Orleans, Philadelphia Inquirer at A9 (cited in note 176) (reporting statements from a New Orleans district attorney that a $15 million verdict in a § 1983 wrongful prosecution action threatened to bankrupt the city). Consider Charles R. Epp, Exploringthe Costs of
Administrative Legalization: City Expenditures on Legal Services, 1960-1995, 34 L & Socy Rev
407, 426-27 (2000) (concluding that total municipal legal expenditures have risen over time, but
have not risen dramatically); MacManus and Turner, 53 Pub Admin Rev at 470 (cited in note
148) (concluding that total litigation costs, as opposed to paying judgments, exerted a budgetary
impact on municipalities).
181 See Trebilcock and Iacobucci, 116 Harv L Rev at 1427 (cited in note 129) (noting that
citizens have too small a financial stake in any particular set of government decisions to effectively hold public officials accountable). See also Freeman, 116 Harv L Rev at 1326 n 177 (cited
in note 12) (questioning whether voters actually hold public officials accountable for poor performance decisions, and stating that "highly attenuated accountability of this kind rarely leads to
disciplinary action by voters"); Hills, 53 Stan L Rev at 1235 (cited in note 172) (asserting that
taxpayers have less incentive to "monitor" governments than do shareholders of private organizations, and that "[g]iven this lax monitoring, one cannot assume that government officials will
internalize the costs that they impose on citizens simply because the government pays damages
to those citizens derived from the government's treasury").
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than private entities to reward or punish employees, change promotion and demotion practices, or create incentives for employees to
respect constitutional rights. ""
Finally, the fairness rationale for respondeat superior, that the
entity that enjoys the profits of its employees' labor also should bear
the risk of their misconduct, carries less force in the public sector than
in the private sector. Although in both cases the fairness rationale supports providing full compensation for an injured victim, public entities
are not motivated by profit, and it is the general populace that ultimately benefits from the labor of government employees rather than a
group of private investors or shareholders." Indeed, the Supreme Court
has relied upon the perceived unfairness of punishing innocent taxpayers for the wrongdoing of government employees to give governmental
entities other § 1983 immunities.'8'
The view that damages liability does not deter government misconduct is a controversial one. Professor Levinson's work, for example, has inspired numerous responses by commentators contending
that civil liability risk can cause public institutions to change their behavior." Although this Article does not attempt to resolve that debate,

182 In Richardson, the Supreme Court relied on the relative inflexibility of public civil service laws in denying qualified immunity for private prison guards. The Court concluded that
private employees can use rewards and punishments to induce employees to act properly while
public civil service laws "may limit the incentives or the ability of individual [governmental]
departments or supervisors flexibly to reward, or to punish, individual employees." 521 US at
410-11. See also Steven L. Schooner, Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder, 33
Pub Cont L J 263, 269 (2004) (noting that private employers have greater flexibility than governmental entities in devising employee incentive programs); Kornhauser, 70 Cal L Rev at
1351-52 (cited in note 133).
183 At the same time, some courts have applied the fairness rationale to public defendants,
reasoning that because a public entity performs a service that benefits the general populace, tort
liability arising out of that service also should be spread across the population. See, for example,
Mary M. v City of Los Angeles, 814 P2d 1341, 1349 (Cal 1991) (stating that "[t]he cost resulting
from misuse of [police] power should be borne by the community, because of the substantial
benefits that the community derives from the lawful exercise of police power," in holding that a
city could be held vicariously liable for a rape committed by a municipal police officer).
184 In City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 US 247 (1981), the Supreme Court held that
municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983, concluding that it would be
unfair to impose punishment "on the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers" for the
wrongs of municipal employees. Id at 267.
185 See, for example, Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 799 (cited in note 168) (arguing that
government officials have an interest in avoiding damages liability because they want to avoid
tradeoffs between paying litigation judgments and spending on other policy initiatives); Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv L Rev 1555, 1679-90 (2003) (arguing that public prison
officials are concerned about the risk of damages awards and seek to reduce liability exposure);
Gilles, 35 Ga L Rev at 848 (cited in note 73) ("There are a number of reasons to expect that the
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several points are worth noting. First, several scholars who assert that

tort liability deters governments also acknowledge that it is the nonfinancial effects of liability such as negative publicity that "more than
anything else" induce governments "to take remedial actions."''M The

effect of negative publicity is significant, as reducing negative publicity
may also reduce the likelihood that lawsuits will be filed in the first
place. ' 8 As Part III.B explains, the fact that governments may be more

responsive than private entities to the risk of negative publicity underscores the importance of imposing respondeat superior liability on
private entities under § 1983 even if municipalities remain exempt.
Second, while several authors argue that a government's concern
about its own budget will induce it to avoid damages liability so that it

can minimize the amount of the budget devoted to litigation payouts
and maximize the amount that it can devote to other priorities," that
incentive, as explained above, is mitigated by both the existence of
separate judgment funds that insulate agency budgets from the consequences of their employees' actions and the long time horizon between constitutional violations and final payouts. Third, although several commentators conclude that tort liability influences government
behavior, they appear to have some difficulty identifying the substantive source of that belief, relying instead in part on "common sense"
and personal belief '
imposition of constitutional tort damage awards against individual officers or their municipal employers does have a deterrent effect on the behavior of these governmental actors and entities.").
186 Gilles, 35 Ga L Rev at 861 (cited in note 73) (acknowledging the role that information plays in
inspiring policymakers' actions). See also Schlanger, 116 Harv L Rev at 1681 (cited in note 185):
Moreover, anyone who reads the newspaper or watches television news knows that inmate
litigation can trigger bad publicity about correctional institutions and officials... [Elven for
an agency that doesn't care about payouts (perhaps because those payouts come from some
general fund rather than the agency's own budget), media coverage of abuses or administrative failures can trigger embarrassing political inquiry and even firings, resignations, or
election losses.
187 See Charles R. Epp, The Fear of Being Sued: Variations in Perceptionsof Legal Threat
among Managers in the United States (unpublished presentation, 2001 Annual Meeting of the
Law & Society Association) (asserting that media exposure of misconduct by the government
leads to an increase in lawsuits filed against it).
188 See, for example, Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 844-47 (cited in note 168); Schlanger,
116 Harv L Rev at 1681 (cited in note 185).
189 See Gilles, 35 Ga L Rev at 855 (cited in note 73) ("Common sense supports this view
that constitutional damages deter police misconduct to some appreciable degree."); id at 858 ("I
believe we can reasonably postulate that government, when exposed to constitutional tort damages, is induced to take affirmative remedial steps to eliminate socially undesirable activity.");
James J. Park, The ConstitutionalTort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 Harv CR-CL L Rev 393,
402 (2003) ("I am inclined to believe that the costs of constitutional violations will outweigh the
benefits in most cases.").
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But perhaps most importantly, even if the participants in this debate disagree about how strongly damages liability influences government behavior, they appear to agree that the incentives created by
damages actions affect governments in a different manner and to a
different degree than they affect private parties. My point is not that
damages liability does not deter governments at all, but that it does
not deter them in the same way as it deters private parties. It is that
difference that courts should account for when deciding whether to
extend Monell to private entities. Unfortunately, courts are not doing
so, and as a result may be underdeterring constitutional misconduct by
private entities that perform state functions.'90
B.

Nonfinancial Constraints on Entity Behavior

On the flipside, just as respondeat superior liability may be more
effective in deterring private entities than public ones, it also may be
less necessary for deterring public entities because there are other
accountability mechanisms, such as concerns about the electoral consequences of negative publicity that can accompany constitutional
violations, that are more likely to keep governments in check than
private parties.
Assuming that government actors are motivated, at least in part,
by the goal of ensuring reelection, electoral incentives can encourage
public officials to take actions to protect constitutional rights. Public
officials ultimately are answerable to their constituents, and those who
tolerate constitutional violations risk being thrown out of office. Although the financial penalty of a tort judgment may not have significant electoral impact, government violations of civil and constitutional
rights can have adverse political consequences that elected officials
would rather avoid. As previously explained, what may cause the most
harm from an electoral perspective is not a damages award, but the

190 It does not follow from the argument that tort damages do not deter governments very
effectively that governments should not be subject to damages liability at all. Even if damages do
not deter governments as well as they deter private parties, they still promote deterrence to
some degree. Moreover, deterrence is only one of § 1983's purposes. The other primary purpose
is compensation, for which damages are necessary. Section 1983 liability also serves other nondeterrence goals, such as satisfying community concerns in making wrongdoers pay for their
misdeeds, and giving meaning and content to constitutional rights. See Park, 38 Harv CR-CL L
Rev at 396 (cited in note 189) (arguing that "the constitutional remedy contributes to a broader
process of rights definition where abstract constitutional provisions are translated into terms
relevant to individuals' injuries"); Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 823 (cited in note 168) (describing the corrective justice theory of tort liability).
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negative publicity that can accompany unconstitutional conduct. "
Exposing civil rights abuses, public corruption, or police brutality may
be more likely to galvanize the public into holding its elected leaders
accountable than paying out a damages award. ' Consequently, government agencies "reportedly fear scandal more than the monetary
liability that might accompany it. ' .. This accountability in turn may
prompt government officials to protect constitutional rights, just as
damages liability may prompt private entities to take liabilityavoidance measures.19
Private entities also care about publicity and therefore will have
an incentive, even in the absence of tort liability, to safeguard constitutional rights if there is a risk that constitutional violations will sully
their reputations and negatively affect their opportunities to obtain
future government contracts. '9' Publicity concerns, however, are effective in promoting accountability only to the extent that misconduct is
likely to come to public light." As explained below, there are two important ways in which the reputations of private entities that perform
public functions are better insulated from public scrutiny than the reputations of government actors. First, open records laws and sunshine
laws are important tools for opening government behavior to public
view, yet many of these laws do not cover private entities that contract

191 See note 186 and accompanying text.
192

See id.

Armacost, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 475 & n 123 (cited in note 172).
Even assuming electoral accountability mechanisms and publicity concerns generally
succeed in deterring public actors, they can create perverse incentives where the political benefits of violating civil rights outweigh the costs. An electorate that values safety, for example, may
prefer that police officers act aggressively, even if that leads to increased instances of excessive
force and increased governmental liability. In those cases, bringing misconduct to public light
may merely increase the popularity of elected officials in voters' eyes by publicizing the administration's efforts to promote safety. Although perverse incentives are a real concern, they will
manifest only in the subset of cases where the political benefits of constitutional violations outweigh the costs. In any event, the shortcomings of electoral incentives would justify, if anything,
imposing additional damages liability on government entities, not exempting private entities from
traditional tort rules of respondeat superior liability.
195 A developing literature regarding the theory of "social norms" posits that private actors
have an incentive, even in the absence of legal constraints, to follow social norms (such as the
norm that society should protect constitutional rights) because of the reputational consequences
of being labeled a bad or untrustworthy actor. For a more comprehensive discussion of social
norm theory, see Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms 1-35 (Harvard 2000).
196 Social norm theory acknowledges that parties may be more likely to adhere to social
norms when "the cost of obtaining and exchanging information about a group member's reputation is low." Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient? PluralisticIgnorance,Heuristics, and the Use of
Norms as PrivateRegulation, 57 Ala L Rev 1,5 (2005).
193

194
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with the government!" Second, although government monitoring of
private contractors should motivate private entities to respect constitutional rights because of the risk that the government will revoke or decline to renew the contracts of habitual rights violators, the government's inability to adequately monitor private behavior means that private parties generally do not have to worry that their misconduct either
will be discovered or will lead to the loss of future contracts. For private
entities on which these nonfinancial checks exert less force, respondeat

superior liability becomes that much more important for ensuring that
private entities have sufficient incentive to reduce the risk of constitutional violations.
1. Open records laws.
One important way "to hold the governors accountable to the
governed"'" is to use state freedom of information (FOI) and sunshine
laws to make the public aware of what its government is doing. Specifically, state FOI laws allow the public access to information that may
be relevant to holding public officials accountable, such as information
regarding government abuse and employee misconduct."
Most state FOI and open meeting laws, however, apply by their
express terms only to public agencies, and not to private entities that
contract with those agencies to perform public services. Although
197

Open records laws, also known as freedom of information laws, make certain govern-

ment records available for public inspection. See NLRB v Robbins Tire & Rubber Co, 437 US
214,221 (1978) (stating that the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requires that materials in the hands of federal agencies, subject to certain exceptions, must be made publicly available). Sunshine laws, also known as open meeting laws, make certain government meetings and
deliberations open to the public. See Patience A. Crowder, "Ain't No Sunshine": Examining
Informality and State Open Meetings Acts as the Anti-public Norm in Inner-city Redevelopment
Deal Making,74 Tenn L Rev 623, 625 (2007) (defining sunshine laws).
198 Robbins Tire & Rubber Co, 437 US at 242 (referring to FOIA).
199 See, for example, Encore College Bookstores, Inc v Auxiliary Service Corp, 663 NE2d
302, 305 (NY 1995) (holding that the purpose of New York's FOI statute "is to shed light on
government decision making, which in turn both permits the electorate to make informed choices regarding governmental activities and facilitates exposure of waste, negligence and abuse"); 94
Op Ky Atty Gen 27, No 94-ORD-27, 3 (Mar 2, 1994) ("[T]he courts and this Office have long
recognized that complaints against public officers and employees are not exempt from inspection" under Kentucky's Public Records Act.).
200 See generally Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public's Right to Know: The Debate over
Privatization and Access to Government Information under State Law, 27 Fla St U L Rev 825
(2000) (surveying different state public records laws). Only a few states have laws that explicitly
apply to private entities. Florida's FOI law applies to private entities that act "on behalf of any
public agency," and Georgia's Open Records Act applies to "[r]ecords received or maintained by a
... private entity in the performance of a service or function for or on behalf of an agency." Fla Stat
Ann § 119.011(2) (West); Ga Code Ann § 50-18-70(a) (Lexis). For a discussion about the applicabil-
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courts in many states have interpreted their FOI statutes to include
private entities in certain circumstances, the tests that state courts use
differ from the state action test used for subjecting a private party to
§ 1983.2" Some states, for example, ignore whether the private entity
performs a public function and instead look to whether the records at
issue are held by a public agency, meaning that private entities can2
avoid exposure simply by holding important materials themselves.

Others limit the reach of their FOI laws to private entities that are
publicly funded.2
Of those states that do consider whether a private entity performs a public function, many make clear that "[a] private business
does not open its records to public scrutiny merely by performing services on behalf of the state or a municipal government."' Most states
consider a private entity's public purpose as just one of several factors.
These states often focus on factors that typically would not cover private entities that contract with the government to perform public services. Some states, for example, have declined to subject private entities
to FOI laws where those entities did not receive significant public fund-

ity of the federal Freedom of Information Act to private parties, see Nicole B. C~sarez, Furthering
the Accountability Principlein PrivatizedFederalCorrections:The Need for Access to PrivatePrison
Records, 28 U Mich J L Ref 249,268-91 (1995).
201 See, for example, 'Olelo v Office of Information Practices, 173 P3d 484, 495 (Hawaii
2007) (concluding that "we do not believe that the federal courts' 'state actor' analysis used to
determine constitutional obligations is helpful in determining the scope" of Hawaii's open
records act).
202 See, for example, Harvard Crimson,Inc v President & Fellows of Harvard College, 840 NE2d
518, 521 (Mass 2006) (holding that records of a university police department did not fall within the
state's public records statute because they were created and held by the university rather than by the
police); City of Dubuque v Dubuque Racing Association,420 NW2d 450,453-54 (Iowa 1988) (holding
that records must be held by a public agency to be subject to the state's open records law).
203 See generally Feiser, 27 Fla St U L Rev at 853-57 (cited in note 200) (listing states that
require public funding to subject a private party to state open records laws). See also, for example, State Defenders Union Employees v LegalAid & Defender Association of Detroit,584 NW2d
359, 362 (Mich App 1998); 02 Op Okla Atty Gen 37, No 02-37, 5 (Aug 21, 2002). By contrast,
public funding does not convert private action into state action for purposes of § 1983. See Rendell-Baker v Kohn, 457 US 830,840-41 (1982).
204 Oriana House,Inc v Montgomery, 854 NE2d 193,201 (Ohio 2006). See also, for example,
State Defenders Union Employees, 584 NW2d at 362 (construing "funded" to mean receipt of a
government subsidy); Domestic Violence Services of GreaterNew Haven, Inc v FOI Commission,
704 A2d 827, 832 (Conn App 1998) ("Performing a government service pursuant to a contract
does not make an entity a public agency subject to the act."); IndianapolisConvention & Visitors
Association, Inc v IndianapolisNewspapers; Inc, 577 NE2d 208,214 (Ind 1991); 02 Op Okla Atty
Gen 37 at 6 (holding that private organizations "which contract to provide goods or service to
the public on behalf of a governmental agency ... are not subject to the requirements of the
Oklahoma Open Meeting Act").
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ing."° Others look at whether the private entity was created and managed by the government, which is not the case in most government
contracting contexts.6 Consequently, courts have declined to apply
open records laws to private parties even in situations where they have
found that the private parties performed public functions."
That FOI laws may not apply to private entities does not mean
that information about those companies is unavailable. Even if privately held documents are not disclosable, governments often audit
their contracting partners and those audits, since they are government
documents, would be open to the public. Additionally, publicly held
companies must publicly disclose information to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. But those avenues may not be adequate
substitutes for FOI laws. With audits, private companies may be able
to claim statutory exemptions-for example, that requested documents contain trade secrets or confidential business information -that
would not be applicable if the government were performing those
205 See Marks v McKenzie High School Fact-finding Team, 878 P2d 417, 425 (Or 1994);
Connecticut Humane Society v FOI Commission, 591 A2d 395, 398 (Conn 1991) (relying on the
fact that the Humane Society had not received public funds in almost sixty years in finding that it
was not covered by the state's open records law).
206 See, for example, 'Olelo, 173 P3d at 496 (finding that a private body had to be owned,
operated, or managed by the state to fall within the state's open records law); California State
University v Superior Court, 108 Cal Rptr 2d 870, 880-84 (Cal App 2001) (indicating that only
bodies created or controlled by the state are subject to the state's Public Records Act). There are
a few states, however, in which the private entity's public function would be sufficient to subject
it to open records laws. See, for example, Ga Code Ann § 50-18-70(a) (Lexis) (covering private
entities that perform services "on behalf of" a public agency); Encore College Bookstores, 663
NE2d at 305-06 (holding that a private company running a public university's campus bookstore
fell within the state's FOI law because its records were created for the benefit of the state); 94
Op Ky Atty Gen 27 at 4 (cited in note 199) (suggesting that private companies that contract with
the government may lose their private character).
207 See, for example, Oriana House, 854 NE2d at 201 (acknowledging that a nonprofit company that ran a local correctional facility performed what "has traditionally been a uniquely
government function" but finding that it was not subject to the state's open records law because
the company was neither created nor controlled by the government); Marks, 878 P2d at 424-26
(finding that a factfinding body, which investigated the actions of a high school administration,
performed a traditional public function and was created at the state's behest, but was not subject
to the open records law because the body had limited independent authority and was not publicly funded); Connecticut Humane Society, 591 A2d at 397-99 (finding that the Humane Society
was not subject to an open records law, even though the court found that the society performed a
public function by helping to detain, shelter, and euthanize animals, and that Humane Society
employees were authorized by statute to engage in law enforcement activities including arresting, detaining, and fining individuals who committed animal cruelty or interfered with the prevention of animal cruelty).
208 See, for example, Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-law-like Obligations on Private[ized] Entities, 49 UCLA L Rev 1717, 1721 (2002) (describing how securities laws "place a
great deal of information about private corporations in the public domain").
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services itself." For example, private prisons routinely refuse on trade
secret grounds to disclose documents relating to the use of force

against prisoners."o Moreover, not all companies that perform traditional public functions are publicly traded. Thus, because state FOI laws do

not cover many private entities that are subject to § 1983 to the same
extent that they cover public entities, those laws may not promote the
same degree of accountability that they do in the public sphere.
2. Monitoring and private accountability.
In theory, any constraints that deter government actors from violating constitutional rights also should trickle down to the private

entities with whom they contract. If public officials have an incentive
to minimize their own constitutional violations, they likely have a

similar incentive to minimize the constitutional violations committed
by entities with whom they contract because those violations can reflect badly on the government. Governments can penalize contractors
who violate constitutional rights by not renewing their contracts, and
can choose to contract with companies that are more likely to respect

constitutional principles. Competition for government contracts
should create an incentive for private entities to protect constitutional
rights, making respondeat superior liability less important.
The assumption underlying this view is that governments can

adequately monitor the actions of the private parties with whom they
contract. " Without effective and thorough monitoring through which

209 See Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract:Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection
and Choice, 33 Pub Cont L J 321, 345 (2004) (stating that responses to FOI requests involving
private contractors "exhibit redactions of data that routinely would be available if public officials
had performed the work"). See also Encore College Bookstores, 663 NE2d at 306-08 (finding
that an auxiliary service company that operated a bookstore for a public university was subject
to the state's open records laws, but that the requested documents did not have to be disclosed
because they contained protected commercial information).
210 See, for example, Talbot, The Lost Children, New Yorker at 61 (cited in note 13) (describing how Corrections Corporation of America refused to respond to a FOIA request regarding the legal authority to use force on inmates on the ground that compliance would require it to
disclose business secrets); Nina Bernstein, Few Details on Immigrants Who Died in U.S. Custody,
NY Tunes Al (May 5,2008) (noting that documents detailing how a CCA prisoner was "shackled
and pinned to the floor of the medical unit as he moaned and vomited, then left in a disciplinary
cell for more than 13 hours, despite repeated notations that he was unresponsive and intermittently foaming at the mouth" were labeled "proprietary information-not for distribution");
Karen Testa, ACLU Sues to Get Wackenhut-run Prison's Records, Miami Herald B2 (June 6,
1999) (describing how Wackenhut refused to disclose records relating to several of its prisons).
211 See, for example, Jack M. Beermann, Privatizationand PoliticalAccountability, 28 Fordham Urban L J 1507, 1526 (2001) (noting that where governments contract public services to
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governments can assess how well private entities respect constitutional
rights, governments will struggle to hold private entities accountable." '

Assuredly, there are many examples where government monitoring
effectively rooted out poor performance by a private contractor. "' On
the whole, however, there are many reasons to believe that monitoring
is not a fully effective device for maintaining private accountability.
Initially, regardless of how effectively governments monitor their
contracting partners, respondeat superior liability can achieve the
same goal of monitoring-that is, accountability -in a cheaper and
more efficient way. A monitoring regime imposes an added layer of

bureaucracy that is expensive and that further attenuates the link between the contracting party and the public officials ultimately accountable to the electorate. Instead of attempting to encourage private

entities to respect constitutional rights by creating a cumbersome monitoring structure, it would be more efficient to force those entities to

internalize the costs of their employees' misconduct through respondeat superior liability. Respondeat superior helps mitigate the need for,

and can overcome the limitations of, government monitoring while still
providing incentives for private entities to behave responsibly." ' And

because the private entity itself is probably in the best position to track
its employees' behavior, placing responsibility on the private entity, rather than on the government, to ensure compliance with constitutional
requirements will be more cost effective. In light of these advantages,

the argument that government monitoring can hold private entities accountable, rather than removing a justification for respondeat superior
liability, shows why respondeat superior liability is a good idea.

private parties, government agencies "will be responsible for monitoring the performance" of
contracting parties).
212 Consider Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1436-37 (cited in note 11) ("[Cllose government
involvement is the best means for ensuring constitutional accountability."); Jody Freeman, The
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 NYU L Rev 543, 546-49 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of government monitoring for making private parties accountable).
213 See, for example, Richard Lardner, Contract for War Support Faulted; KBR Agreement
Focus of Hearing, Boston Globe 5 (May 5, 2009) (describing how a federal contractor responsible for supporting US troops in Iraq received a "withering review" after government audits
exposed as much as $4.7 billion in questionable costs); Dolovich, 55 Duke L J at 497 (cited in
note 151) (noting that "states experimenting with privatization have rescinded a number of
private prison contracts after contractor abuses came to light").
214 Of course, even with respondeat superior liability, governments will still have to monitor
their contracts with private parties because governments need to track contract performance, not
just a contractor's liability exposure. But respondeat superior liability can at least reduce the
government's monitoring burden by allowing the government to devote its scarce resources to
monitoring other aspects of the contracting process.
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Additionally, monitoring itself is fraught with difficulties. In order
to monitor effectively, a government has to know what information it
is looking for and how to find it. Especially for traditional public services that have more abstract democratic goals than procurement or
purchase contracts, it is difficult to develop a useful metric for evaluating private performance. Measuring whether a contractor provided
the correct number of pencils is much easier than measuring, for example, how many assaults on prisoners took place at a private prison,
which assaults were justified and which were not, and how those results compare against the cost of the contract and the overall quality
of service."' Even where governments do create metrics, different contracts focus on different performance measures, making comparisons
across providers difficult."'
Consequently, monitoring often focuses instead on what governments can measure: costs. The amount of cost savings that a contract
provides tends to be the most common method for evaluating private
contractors. " Given that private entities are exempt from respondeat
superior liability, focusing primarily on costs raises serious concerns.
Employer measures to safeguard constitutional rights -including investing in employee training, paying higher wages to reduce turnover,
creating employee incentive programs, and putting greater care into
hiring decisions-are expensive. Where employers do not bear the
costs of their employees' constitutional violations, focusing on costs
threatens to create a "race to the bottom" in which the companies
achieving the greatest cost savings are those that pay their employees

215 See Aman, 14 Ind J Global Legal Stud at 320 (cited in note 14) (noting that one investigation of a private prison healthcare provider showed that monitoring focused much more on
measuring whether the provider followed the contract's technical requirements than on the
quality of the health care provided); Note, 115 Harv L Rev at 1873-74 (cited in note 130) (describing the difficulties of evaluating imprecise standards like quality); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 Fla St U L Rev 155, 171 (2000) (suggesting that the vaguer the final goal, the
more difficult it will be to develop a metric for measuring success). See also Dolovich, 55 Duke L
J at 478 (cited in note 151) (describing the difficulty of defining in a contract how to effectively
provide for prison health care and inmate safety).
216 See Note, 115 Harv L Rev at 1873-74 & n 38 (cited in note 130) (describing how, in the
private prison context, different states evaluate completely different performance measures). See
also Austin and Coventry, Emerging Issues on PrivatizedPrisons at 37 (cited in note 13) (noting
the dearth of useful studies of private prisons and noting that many existing studies have significant methodological flaws).
217 See Aman, 14 Ind J Global Legal Stud at 304 (cited in note 14) (asserting that governments' focus is "almost wholly in terms of cost and compliance" when choosing private contractors); Schooner, 33 Pub Cont L J at 274 (cited in note 182) (identifying cost savings as one of the
most common measures that governments use to evaluate private contractors).
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the least and that invest the least in employee training and support. .8
In other words, the current monitoring system, rather than providing a
check against private misconduct, may actually encourage it by rewarding those companies that operate on the cheap and devote fewer
resources to civil rights protection.
Even if governments could design effective metrics, financial concerns may discourage them from engaging in thorough monitoring. One
main purpose of privatization is to achieve cost savings. ' Effective monitoring, particularly of complex, multifaceted programs, is expensive, requiring significant amounts of data as well as a well-trained workforce to
evaluate it."' Monitoring can add 15 to 20 percent to the cost of a contract, which in many cases makes it more expensive for the government
to contract out a service than to perform the service itself.n
Governments also have other incentives to avoid intensive monitoring. Misconduct by a private contractor reflects badly on the government. Government actors may be hesitant to admit that they made
a mistake in choosing a contracting partner, and therefore may have
their own incentives to shield contractor misconduct from public
view. Decreased monitoring both reduces the chances of public exposure of contractor misconduct and also allows the government to

deny knowledge of any wrongdoing if the misconduct is made public.

218 See, for example, Dolovich, 55 Duke L J at 460-61 (cited in note 151) (asserting that
private prisons "have prioritized economy above all else," which may have contributed to mistreatment of inmates).
219 See, for example, Freeman, 116 Harv L Rev at 1291-92 (cited in note 12); Metzger, 103
Colum L Rev at 1372 n 9 (cited in note 11). See generally E.S. Savas, Privatization:The Key to
Better Government (Chatham 1987).
220 See Dolovich, 55 Duke L J at 492 (cited in note 151) ("Monitoring is necessarily labor
intensive and therefore expensive, requiring an investment that states-which turned to privatization to save money-are not eager to make.").
221 See Korpi, Panel Discussion, Outsourcing Government? (cited in note 12). Because
monitoring costs typically are not factored into the price of the contract, see id; Austin and Coventry, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons at 16 (cited in note 13), thorough monitoring can
cause the government to lose money through privatization, unless it chooses instead to try and
monitor on the cheap.
222 See Aman, 14 Ind J Global Legal Stud at 321 & n 88 (cited in note 14) (describing how
New York officials began defending the behavior of its contractor, Prison Health Services (PHS),
against charges of misconduct because of concerns that PHS's problems "could negatively impact" the reputation of the city agency that contracted with PHS). Consider Freeman, 28 Fla St
U L Rev at 179-80 (cited in note 215) (noting that an agency "may be more interested in maintaining smooth relationships with its contractual partners over the long term than in individual
fairness or responsiveness to consumers in the short term").
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In this sense, government agencies may be prone to a contracting form
of agency capture.
Furthermore, the argument that the risk of losing government
contracts will keep private entities in check assumes an efficiently
functioning marketplace in which governments can replace bad contractors with good ones. Many of the markets for traditional public
services, however, are essentially oligopolies with few market participants. Private contractors therefore face little risk that their employees' constitutional violations will result in revoked contracts or
lost business. In fact, there appears to be little repercussion for private
entities, even in cases where there is widespread public outrage and
negative publicity. For example, even after the extensive public exposure of Blackwater's misconduct, the State Department nonetheless
renewed its contract. A rule of respondeat superior liability, by con223

See, for example, James Theodore Gentry, Note, The PanopticonRevisited: The Problem

of Monitoring Private Prisons,96 Yale L J 353,360 (1986); Dolovich, 55 Duke L J at 494 (cited in
note 151) (arguing that inspectors have ample opportunity to develop a rapport with prison
administrators, creating the risk of capture). Several examples exist of this form of agency capture. A New York Times investigation of New York City's contract with PHS to provide health
services to prisoners found that city officials excused contract violations by PHS at least nineteen
different times so that PHS would receive a passing score rather than a failing one. Paul von
Zielbauer, Evaluation of Medical Care Provider in the City's Jails is Questioned, NY Times B1
(Dec 26, 2005). At the federal level, when a US Army official responsible for managing a Defense Department contract with Kellogg, Brown & Root for services in Iraq refused to approve
$1 billion in undocumented spending based on the recommendation of internal army auditors,
that official was taken off the contract and replaced with someone who approved most of the
challenged charges. See James Risen, Army Overseer Tells of Ouster over KBR Stir,NY Times Al
(June 17,2008).
224 In the welfare context, for example, "when the Arizona state legislature mandated the
privatization of its state welfare system, only one company offered a bid; the state had no selection of alternatives. In Connecticut, Colonial Cooperative Care, Inc was the only bidder for its
contract to determine eligibility for disability-based cash assistance." Stevenson, 45 Ariz L Rev at
92 & nn 37-38 (cited in note 15). Similarly, by the late 1990s two companies accounted for more
than 75 percent of the global private-prison market. Austin and Coventry, Emerging Issues on
Privatized Prisonsat 3-4 (cited in note 13). See also Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 170 (cited in
note 215) (identifying "absence of competition" as an impediment to effective privatization).
225 In May 2008, just six months after the Blackwater incident and while the guards were still
under criminal investigation, the State Department renewed Blackwater's contract to provide
security services in Iraq. See James Risen, Iraq Contractorin Shooting Case Makes Comeback, NY
Times Al (May 10, 2008). The State Department frankly admitted that Blackwater was its only
choice, noting that only three companies met its requirements for providing security services in Iraq
and that the other two were unable to fulfill the contract. See id. Although the State Department
recently revised its decision and decided not to renew Blackwater's contract, it did not do so because it was dissatisfied with Blackwater but because it had little choice after the Iraqi government
denied Blackwater a license to operate in Iraq. See No Pactfor Blackwater,NY Tunes A12 (Jan 31,
2009). See also Kimberly Hefling, KBR Wins ContractDespite CriminalProbe of Deaths, Deseret
Morning News (Feb 8, 2009), online at http://www.deseretnews.con/article/705283640/KBR-winscontract-despite-criminal-probe-of-deaths.htm (visited Nov 4, 2009) (describing how KBR re-
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trast, avoids the problems created by oligopolies by creating an internal incentive to avoid liability that does not depend on competitive
market pressures.
These same shortcomings also make it less likely that governments would, as a condition of contracting, require private parties to
voluntarily assume respondeat superior liability for their employees'
misconduct. The fact that governments want to demonstrate cost savings through the contracting process reduces their interest in imposing
conditions that will raise the cost of contracting. The oligopoly position
of certain private contractors also reduces the government's bargaining
power. Finally, municipalities that undoubtedly want to preserve their
own exemption from § 1983 vicarious liability may be understandably
hesitant to take any action indicating that they believe entities that perform public functions should be subject to respondeat superior liability.
Because of the various problems associated with government monitoring, it likely will not be as effective as respondeat superior liability in
preventing constitutional violations by private entities.
C. The Risk of Spending Tradeoffs
Even assuming that governmental entities and private entities respond to liability incentives in relatively similar ways, there is one other
reason to impose respondeat superior on private parties even if municipalities are exempt. Imposing additional damages liability on governments raises the risk that a government entity will respond to a damages judgment not by changing the behavior that resulted in liability, but
instead by cutting spending from other valuable government services or
programs. This concern, however, may be less pronounced for private
entities. Consequently, imposing respondeat superior liability on governments may be more likely to create a risk of counterproductive and
socially harmful spending tradeoffs than created by imposing similar

ceived a new $35 million federal contract for services in Iraq after receiving repeated negative
reviews and while it was the subject of a criminal investigation for the deaths of two US soldiers
in Iraq).
Similarly, employees of the private company CACI International were involved in some of
the worst abuses at Abu Ghraib. See Seymour Hersh, Chainof Command: The Road from 9/11 to
Abu Ghraib 22-23 (HarperCollins 2004). Nonetheless, just a year after the Abu Ghraib abuses
surfaced publicly, the Defense Department gave CACI a new $156 million contract, and later
"placed CACI in an elite group of companies allowed to bid on $35 billion worth of IT and
logistical contracts over the next twenty years." Tim Shorrock, Spies for Hire: The Secret World of
Intelligence Outsourcing5 (Simon & Schuster 2008).
226 Consider Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 799-800 (cited in note 168).
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liability on private parties. A few background principles help show why

this is so.
Governments have an obligation to provide for the health, safety,
and welfare of their constituents.M Given the breadth of this mandate,
governmental entities typically provide a wide array of different services and programs. Additionally, governmental entities cannot choose to

opt out of this mission.m Although they have some choice about how
they provide those services, they cannot choose not to provide those
services at all-it is not realistic to believe that a government will eliminate its police force, fire department, or school system because it is unprofitable without violating its obligations to its citizens.!9
The fact that governments provide such a broad array of services
means that they do not necessarily have to compensate for a liability
judgment by reforming the agency employing the individual responsible for the violation. A government entity facing increased liability
costs has three options: it can raise taxes; it can undertake reform efforts to reduce the likelihood of future liability; or it can compensate
by cutting spending in other places. Political realities and the difficulties of initiating institutional reform may make spending cuts fromother programs the path of least resistance in many circumstances.
Raising taxes often is an undesirable and politically risky option, as is
attempting to reform or cut the budget of a popular or bureaucratically powerful agency. An elected official in a district whose residents
value public safety may not respond to a police brutality judgment by
cutting the police department's budget. Instead, that official may be
more likely to respond by cutting other services or programs, thereby
penalizing innocent members of the community."' In fact, this is pre227 See Taylor, 101 F Supp 2d at 263--64 n 4 ("Governmental entities do not get to pick and
choose the activities in which they will engage; these obligations are imposed by law."); Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 847 (cited in note 168) ("Government, however, has a politically enforceable obligation to protect the public from all threats to its safety and welfare.").
228 See, for example, Mead, 64 NC L Rev at 541 (cited in note 62) ("Municipalities are unable,
however, to withdraw from the kinds of activities that expose them to section 1983 liability.").
229 See Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 831 (cited in note 168) (claiming that "no politician
would ever propose reducing police or fire protection in order to avoid tort liability").
230 Although § 1983 damages awards may represent only a small percentage of a government's budget, see note 180, they can be significant enough to necessitate spending cuts Recently, the District Attorney for New Orleans warned that his office may have to file for bankruptcy
protection following a $15 million judgment against the city in a § 1983 wrongful conviction
lawsuit. See Kunzelman, D.A. Says $15M Ruling May Bankrupt New Orleans, Philadelphia Inquirer at A9 (cited in note 176). Additionally, cutting a few million dollars out of government
programs, even if small in percentage terms, may still exert a significant effect on those individuals who rely on those programs.
231 See Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 844-47,870 (cited in note 168).
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cisely the argument that municipal advocates made to Congress during hearings in the early 1980s concerning the possibility of amending
§ 1983 to overrule Monell.
Moreover, assuming political concerns drive these decisions on
spending tradeoffs, the programs that will be cut are those that affect
the most disenfranchised and least politically powerful constituencies.
Ironically, these may be precisely the groups-those that are unrepresented in the halls of government-that § 1983 is designed to protect
the most."' Thus, imposing additional § 1983 liability on governmental
entities may be counterproductive. It may fail to deter if governments
do not respond by correcting the problem that led to the violation,
and it may instead undermine public welfare if governments respond
by cutting other government services.
This concern about counterproductive spending tradeoffs also exists in the private sector, but it may be less salient for private entities.
Private-entity liability naturally will have a lesser effect on the public
fiscY2 Private entities also do not face the same obligations as governmental entities regarding the public welfare. Unlike the government, to
the extent that private entities perform public functions, they do so voluntarily. If the cost of providing public services rises and becomes unprofitable, they can choose to exit the market and avoid the risk to their
enterprise.'z Moreover, they can do so with the confidence that other
private entities (assuming a competitive marketplace) or the government will step in to fill any void created by their exit. Even if the ultimate effect of respondeat superior liability is to reduce the level of privatized services, which may or may not be the case,2 this is not necessarily a bad result. If it is too expensive for a private company to perform public functions in a way that adequately safeguards federally pro232 See generally Municipal Liability under 42 US.C. 1983, Hearings on SB 584, SB 585, and
SB 980 before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong, 1st Sess (1981). See also Brown, 27 BC L Rev at 891 (cited in note 144).
233 See Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 844-47 (cited in note 168) (arguing that the budgetary
effects of government tort liability are disproportionately felt by the society's most disadvantaged).
Section 1983 provides a check against such majoritarian tendencies by giving a cause of action for
violations of constitutional rights, rights designated as too important to trust to majority rule.
234 Presumably, expanded private-entity liability could affect the public fisc if private entities pass on the added costs of additional liability to the government through the contracting
process. If those passed-on costs make the price of contracting too high, however, the government can simply decide not to contract and to perform those services itself.
235 See Kritchevsky, 26 Cardozo L Rev at 78 (cited in note 32) (arguing that private parties
should be subject to heightened liability under § 1983 because they can pick and choose which
services to provide); Taylor, 101 F Supp 2d at 263-64 n 4.
236 See Part IV.C.
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tected rights, then perhaps those functions should be left to the government to perform.
Governments, however, do not have that same option. Their likely
decision in the face of rising costs in one area, assuming a limited ability
to raise taxes, is to cut costs in another area. This difference has been
cited as a reason why private entities should not receive the same immunity from respondeat superior liability that governments receive.2'
This risk of counterproductive spending tradeoffs provides an additional
justification for refusing to extend Monell's exemption from respondeat
superior liability to private parties that perform state action under § 1983.m
IV. OBJECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Even assuming one accepts that both statutory interpretation
principles and policy rationales support imposing respondeat superior
on private parties subject to §1983, there remain several objections
concerning both the necessity and wisdom of such a rule. With respect
to necessity, one might argue that employee indemnification and the
availability of state tort law remedies will ensure, with or without
§ 1983 respondeat superior liability, that private entities take measures
to minimize the risk of constitutional violations. With respect to the
wisdom of such a rule, there is an argument that respondeat superior
liability will have an adverse effect by raising the cost of privatization,
which in turn would reduce the number of services contracted to private companies and would undermine the efficiency gains that come
from privatization.2" Although each criticism raises legitimate con237 See, for example, Taylor, 101 F Supp 2d at 263-64 n 4 ("Governmental entities do not
get to pick and choose the activities in which they will engage .... Thus, various immunities and
privileges given to governmental entities ... reflect the notion that the taxpayers and public
officials should not be exposed to the burdens of litigation when carrying out their mandated
activities."). Consider Rosenthal, 9 U Pa J Const L at 859-60 (cited in note 168) (arguing that
municipal vicarious liability would force city governments to commit too many resources to
preventing constitutional violations at the expense of other priorities).
238 Relying on concerns about the public fisc to treat private and public entities differently
also appears consistent with the concerns of § 1983's framers. The legislative debates surrounding
§ 1983 reveal that several members of Congress warned that exposing municipal budgets to
significant liability would end up hurting the community rather than helping it. See Cong Globe,
42d Cong, 1st Sess 772 (Apr 18, 1871) (statement of Sen Thurman) (arguing that the money used
to pay § 1983 judgments against municipalities would come at the expense of other municipal
services); Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess 772, 789 (Apr 19, 1871) (statement of Rep Kerr) (arguing that expanded liability would prevent municipalities from performing "their necessary and
customary functions").
239 The notion that private companies will provide superior services at cheaper prices is one
of the primary justifications for privatizing traditional government services. See note 219 and
accompanying text.
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cerns, as explained below, none provides a sufficient reason to exempt
private entities from respondeat superior liability.
A. Employee Indemnification
One argument against subjecting private § 1983 defendants to
respondeat superior liability is that it is unnecessary because many
employers indemnify their employees for legal wrongs they commit
within the scope of their employment. ' ° In essence, indemnification is
a private form of respondeat superior because the employer agrees to

assume the liabilities and litigation costs incurred by its employees. If
indemnification practices truly overlapped with the scope of respon-

deat superior liability, this argument might have greater force. But a
number of gaps exist such that relying on indemnification will lead to

suboptimal deterrence and will leave many victims of constitutional
violations without an adequate remedy.
While many employers do indemnify their employees, not all employers do so.4' Even for those that indemnify, however, the combina240 See, for example, Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants:Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 Hastings L J 499,547 n 258 (1993) (noting that many state
and local laws require indemnification of police officers); Lant B. Davis, et al, Suing the Police in
FederalCourt,88 Yale L J 781,810-11 (1979) (concluding from a sample of cases from Connecticut
that police departments routinely foot the cost of lawsuits against individual officers).
241 Professor Nina Pillard has studied indemnification of federal employees in Bivens actions and has concluded that indemnification "is a virtual certainty." Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking
Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials' Individual Liability under Bivens, 88
Georgetown L J 65, 76-78 & n 51 (1999) (noting that the federal government represented 98
percent of Bivens defendants who requested counsel). However, in litigation, the United States
has indicated that federal indemnification is not automatic. See Oral Argument of Jeffrey A.
Lamken on Behalf of the United States, CorrectionalServices Corp v Malekso, No 00-860, *24
(Oct 1, 2001) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL 1182728) ("Lamken Argument") ("The Government, for example, does not routinely identify its employees before a judgment or even after
judgment. On occasion we both decline to indemnify them."). See also Brief of the United States
as Amicus Curiae, Richardson v McKnight, No 96-318, *19 (filed Feb 7, 1997) (available on Westlaw at 1997 WL 63323) (noting that while private employers have "broad latitude" to offer to
indemnify employees, "[tlhe government has only a limited ability to indemnify its employees for
constitutional tort liability and is unable to promise in advance to indemnify employees for
judgments of unknown magnitude").
While private employers do not face the same statutory constraints on indemnification as the
federal government and while many companies performing public functions likely do indemnify
their employees to some extent, see, for example, Oral Argument of Charles R. Ray on Behalf of
Petitioners, Richardson v McKnight, No 96-318, *51 (Mar 19, 1997) (available on Westlaw at 1997
WL 136255) (acknowledging that private prison indemnified its employees), it is not clear that
private entities universally indemnify their employees. See Lamken Argument at *24-25 (stating
that a "corporation will not necessarily pick up the tab" for lawsuits against their employees and
arguing that corporations should not indemnify automatically, but only where indemnification is
"in the corporate interest"). Private employees are less likely than public employees to be
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tion of common-law good-faith immunity for private § 1983 defendants along with limitations on indemnification for bad faith actions
makes indemnification an inadequate substitute for respondeat superior liability.
First, the judicial trend toward recognizing a defense of good
faith immunity will result in many cases where indemnification does
not ensure that an injured plaintiff obtains redress. Even though private employees do not receive qualified immunity under § 1983,22 a
number of courts have allowed private employees to claim commonlaw good-faith immunity that protects employees unless they acted
with malice or its equivalent.. A plaintiff suing under an indemnification regime will receive no recovery at all, from either the employer or
the employee, if the employee is immune. By contrast, under respondeat superior principles, the employee's immunity does not bar a

plaintiff from recovering from the employer."
Second, in situations where an employee acts maliciously and
does not receive immunity, a plaintiff still might not receive full compensation because many indemnification policies exclude coverage for
intentional or reckless conduct. 5 Some conduct that § 1983 makes
unionized and thus to reap the benefits of collective bargaining, and may not be sophisticated
enough on their own to demand indemnification in their own negotiations. Moreover, the benefit
of indemnification is not costless, as it likely comes at the expense of some other benefit foregone. Employee indemnification is not an automatic right, but something that employees must
bargain for. By prioritizing indemnification, private employees may lose out on some other
benefit that they have to give up in order to obtain indemnification.
242 See Richardson,521 US at 399.
243 See, for example, Clement v City of Glendale,518 F3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir 2008) (allowing a private towing company to assert a good faith immunity defense in a § 1983 action);
Pinsky v Duncan, 79 F3d 306, 312-13 (2d Cir 1996); Vector Research, Inc v Howard & Howard
Attorneys, PC, 76 F3d 692, 699 (6th Cir 1996); Jordan v Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20
F3d 1250, 1276-77 (3d Cir 1994); Wyatt v Cole, 994 F2d 1113,1118 (5th Cir 1993). Even after the
Supreme Court held in Richardson that private prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity, some courts have granted qualified immunity to other private defendants. See, for example, Bartell v Lohiser, 12 F Supp 2d 640, 645-46 (ED Mich 1998) (finding that employees of a
private contractor providing foster care services could receive qualified immunity under § 1983).
244 An employer cannot assert the employee's immunity as a defense in a claim seeking to
hold the employer vicariously liable for the employee's misconduct. See Restatement (Second)
of Agency § 217(b)(ii) (1958); id at comment b; Harper, James, and Gray, 5 Harper,James and
Gray on Torts § 26.17 at 136-38 (cited in note 33).
245 See, for example, Martin A. Schwartz, Should JuriesBe Informed That Municipality Will
Indemnify Officer's § 1983 Liability for ConstitutionalWrongdoing?, 86 Iowa L Rev 1209, 1217
(2001); 1 Cal Gov Code § 996.4 (stating that a public employee is not entitled to indemnification
if the employee acted out of fraud, corruption, or malice). See also Kramer and Sykes, 1987 S Ct
Rev at 277 n 95 (cited in note 70); City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 US 247, 269 n 30
(1981). It is entirely possible that entities performing public functions will indemnify for bad
faith actions given the possibility that employees will commit bad faith constitutional violations.
But because private indemnification agreements, unlike public ones, are not governed by statute,
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actionable, however, is intentional or reckless. Police misconduct, for
example, including warrantless searches and excessive force, will involve intentional actions. Many prisoner § 1983 actions come under
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, which requires the defendant to act with "deliberate indifference," a standard roughly equivalent to recklessness. Additionally,
any case where the conduct in question gives rise to punitive damages
will typically involve intentional or reckless behavior. By contrast,
respondeat superior principles do not exclude intentional and reckless
conduct."7 While some entities may indemnify their employees for bad
faith conduct even if not contractually obligated, '" there is no guarantee that they will do so.

Several practical concerns also undermine the argument that indemnification and respondeat superior are functionally equivalent.
First, the argument assumes that a victim can easily identify the individual employee responsible for the violation. Especially in actions
involving a failure to act, identifying the responsible individuals may
249
constitute a
be extremely difficult. Moreover, pro seM litigants, who
substantial percentage of § 1983 plaintiffs, may not know which indiand because many employment agreements are not publicly available, it is unclear whether such
employers do indemnify bad faith misconduct, and there are good reasons to think that they
would not offer such extensive indemnification. See note 229.
246 See Farmer v Brennan, 511 US 825, 836 (1994) (finding that the deliberate indifference
required to violate the Eighth Amendment is similar to recklessness).
247 Courts have applied respondeat superior to intentional torts if the tort arises out of the
employment relationship rather than being motivated by personal ill will. See Alan 0. Sykes, The
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and
Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv L Rev 563, 589 (1988); Restatement (Second) Agency § 228
(stating that a principal is liable for an agent's intentional use of force when the use of force is
foreseeable); Fitzgeraldv Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co, 68 F3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir
1995) (applying respondeat superior to intentional discrimination under § 1981 for "those intentional wrongs... committed in furtherance of the employment") (quotation marks omitted).
248 See Richard Emery and Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter
Police Misconduct. The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 Fordham
Urban L J 587, 587 (2000) (arguing that New York City "regularly indemnifies police officers
regardless of whether they acted intentionally, recklessly, or brutally").
249 In Brown v Districtof Columbia, 514 F3d 1279 (DC Cir 2008), a prisoner alleged that his
constitutional rights were violated when a doctor's order to have the plaintiff immediately transferred to the hospital for surgery were never carried out. Complaint, Brown v Districtof Columbia, No 04-2195, *8-9 (DDC filed Dec 20, 2004). The plaintiff had no way of knowing which
employees were responsible for failing to carry out the doctor's order. Similarly, in Malesko v
CorrectionalServices Corp, 1999 WL 549003 (SDNY), the plaintiff originally filed his complaint
against the private prison company because he could not identify the responsible employees. Id
at *2-3. By the time he sought to amend his complaint to add the individual employees, the
statute of limitations had passed.
250 One DOJ study found that 96 percent of prisoner § 1983 cases were pro se. See Roger A.
Hanson and Henry W.K. Daley, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Challenging the Conditions of Pris-
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viduals to sue, or simply may assume that the employer is the ultimately responsible party and therefore the natural defendant. Even

for those plaintiffs who eventually obtain counsel, it may be too late to
amend the complaint to add new defendants without running afoul of
the statute of limitations.!"
Finally, indemnity is not equivalent to respondeat superior because the identity of the named defendant matters in terms of the
likely recovery for the plaintiff. There is a significant difference between suing an individual employee as a named defendant and suing a
company as a named defendant, even if the ultimate payout will come
from the same pocket in either case. Because juries in § 1983 cases
generally are not informed that individual defendants are indemnified, 2 they are more inclined to absolve or give artificially low damage awards against individual defendants than against entity defendants, as they do not want to destroy an individual's finances.23 Thus,
indemnification may end up underdeterring by failing to create a sufficient incentive for employers to respect constitutional rights.

ons and Jails: A Report on Section 1983 Litigation 21 (DOJ Dec 1994), online at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/ccopaj.pdf (visited Aug 9,2009).
251 Most circuits hold that amending a complaint to add names of individual defendants
does not "relate back" to the original complaint for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.
See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 6A FederalPracticeand Procedure § 1498 (West 4th ed 2008).
252 See, for example, Schwartz, 86 Iowa L Rev at 1229-30 (cited in note 245) (stating that
the majority of courts preclude juries in § 1983 cases from learning that an individual defendant
will be indemnified).
253 See Beermann, 48 DePaul L Rev at 667 (cited in note 72) (arguing that indemnification
"is a poor substitute for vicarious liability" because juries will think that damages will be paid by
the employee directly). See also Schuck, 77 Georgetown L J at 1755 n 11 (cited in note 70) (noting that "jury sympathies" for individual defendants make it more difficult for aggrieved plaintiffs to recover from individual defendants).
Although it is possible that jurors will assume individual defendants are indemnified and will
award damages as if the corporation was the defendant, if that were true, then one would expect
no difference between jury awards against individual defendants and jury awards against corporate defendants. Available data, however, suggest that jurors issue higher awards against corporate defendants. See, for example, Audrey Chin and Mark A. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty
Pockets vii, 43 (RAND 1985) (indicating that corporations typically pay "30 percent more than
what an individual defendant would pay in the same case" and 4.4 times more where serious
injury occurs); Valerie P. Hans and M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate versus Individual
Wrongdoing, 13 L & Human Beh 151, 162 (1989) (conducting experiments suggesting that juries
treat individuals more favorably than corporations). It is not certain whether this difference is
attributable to juries deflating awards against individual defendants, inflating awards against
corporate defendants, or some combination of both.
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State Tort Analogues

A related argument is that respondeat superior liability under
§ 1983 is unnecessary for promoting deterrence because private entities already are subject to respondeat superior under state common
law and therefore will invest in deterrence regardless of § 1983's particular liability rules. Given the lower threshold for liability for certain
state law torts -a state law medical malpractice action requires only
negligence, for example, while a § 1983 claim for constitutionally inadequate medical care requires a showing of deliberate indifferencestate tort law might provide superior deterrence than § 1983. Although state tort law may create some incentives for private employers to invest in deterrence, just as with indemnification, the lack of full
overlap between state tort law and § 1983 makes state tort law an inadequate safeguard of constitutional protections.
Although certain § 1983 actions have a state tort analogue-for
example a prisoner's claim for constitutionally inadequate medical care
also can be brought as a medical malpractice claim-many others do
not.' A number of constitutional and federal rights protected by § 1983,
including free speech and free exercise rights, privacy and reproductive
rights, procedural due process rights including the notice and opportunity to be heard, substantive due process rights, voting rights protections, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees, and Fourth
Amendment protections against warrantless searches may not be equivalently protected under state tort law."5 In fact, many of the § 1983 actions brought against private entities may involve constitutional rights
for which there is no easy state tort analogue. Professor Gillian Metzger
conducted an informal study of thirty-five constitutional actions implicating private parties and found that the majority raised substantive
due process, procedural due process, First Amendment, and Fourth
Amendment claims.2 Moreover, constitutional law generally evolves
more rapidly than state common law, and so discrepancies between the
254 The perceived inadequacy of state law to deter constitutional violations was a major
premise underlying the Court's decision in Monroe v Pape. Justice John Marshall Harlan stated
in concurrence that "[it would indeed be the purest form of coincidence if the state remedies for
violations of common-law rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to redress those injuries which only a state official can cause and against which the Constitution provides protection."
Monroe, 365 US at 196 n 5 (Harlan concurring).
255 Some federal statutory and constitutional rights, however, may have analogues in state
constitutions. In Heck v Humphrey, 512 US 477 (1994), the Supreme Court hinted that the elements of a § 1983 constitutional claim would be determined by the closest common law analogue. Id at 483-84. Since then, however, the Court has never returned to that reasoning.
256 See Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1455 & n 308 (cited in note 11).
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two that do not exist today may develop in the future.5' State law claims
also are subject to state common law and statutory defenses, some of
which may be inapplicable or preempted in § 1983 actions.m Thus, state
law is unlikely to provide the same scope of protection as § 1983.
Even if state tort law were equivalent to § 1983 in theory, it likely
is not in practice. One major difference between state common law
and § 1983 is that the latter provides for attorneys' fees for prevailing
plaintiffs. 9 The lure of attorney's fees makes it possible for aggrieved
plaintiffs to bring § 1983 actions that perhaps might not be brought if
the only remedy were under state common law, especially in cases
where the level of damages is relatively low. Additionally, the federal
in forma pauperis statute permits federal courts to appoint counsel for
indigent prisoners, making it easier for prisoners to obtain counsel for
federal § 1983 actions than for tort actions in state court.'6
Third, a number of states have capped tort damages or adopted
other tort reform measures that reduce the deterrent effect of state law
and restrict the ability of aggrieved plaintiffs to be made whole.261 Section
1983 damages, by contrast, are not capped other than by ordinary com-

257 See, for example, Chemerinsky, 80 Nw U L Rev at 518 (cited in note 162).
258 See, for example, Thompson v Connick, 553 F3d 836, 846 (5th Cir 2008) (noting, in an
action where a wrongfully convicted plaintiff brought both a federal § 1983 claim and state law
claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress, that the district
court found the state law claims barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity but allowed the
§ 1983 claim to proceed).
259 See 42 USC § 1988(b) (authorizing the court, in its discretion, to award a "reasonable
attorney's fee" to a prevailing party).
260 See 28 USC § 1915(e)(1). To be sure, the IFP statute is no panacea, as it is unclear how
often courts appoint counsel and how often counsel accept those appointments, but the statute
does not appear to be an empty letter. In fact, appellate courts have reversed district court decisions refusing to appoint counsel. See, for example, Pruitt v Mote, 503 F3d 647,649 (7th Cir 2007)
(en banc); Hodge v Police Officers, 802 F2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir 1986). Even if counsel is not appointed particularly often, the opportunity for appointment may be valuable, given the high
number of § 1983 lawsuits brought by prisoners and the high percentage of prisoners proceeding
pro se. See Hanson and Daley, Challenging the Conditions of Prisons and Jails at 21 (cited in
note 250) (noting that 96 percent of prisoner § 1983 lawsuits were pro se); Peter W Low and
John C. Jeffries, Jr, FederalCourts and the Law of Federal-stateRelations 1080 (Foundation 5th
ed 2004) (stating that in the early 19 80s, prisoner lawsuits comprised as much as 50 percent of the
federal courts' § 1983 docket).
261 For example, a number of states, but not the federal government, have adopted statutes
capping the noneconomic damages that plaintiffs can collect. See, for example, Michael P Allen,
A Survey and Some Commentary on Federal"Tort Reform," 39 Akron L Rev 909,913 n 11 (2006)
(collecting state statutes). For a sample of the large number of enacted and proposed state-level
tort reform statutes, see National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, Tort Reform: An
Overview of State Legislative Efforts to Improve the Civil Justice System, online at
http://www.namic.orglreports/tortreform (visited Aug 9, 2009).
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mon law principles. That state tort law is constantly subject to change,
either in terms of expanding or retracting liability, highlights the danger
of making § 1983 liability turn on the whims of state legislatures. Section
1983 was meant to provide a uniform federal remedy for violations of
federal rights, and that remedy should not rise and fall based on how

state legislatures choose to regulate their tort regimes on any given day.O
Finally, using the availability of state law remedies to limit

§ 1983's reach is inconsistent with the statute's motivation and purpose. In Monroe v Pape, the Supreme Court found that Congress be-

lieved § 1983 was necessary because states would not enforce their
own laws against groups like the Ku Klux Klan that were terrorizing

African-Americans. The Court concluded that "[i]t was not the unavailability of state remedies but the failure of certain States to enforce the laws with an equal hand that furnished the powerful momen-

tum behind" § 1983. ' Section 1983 was intended to be "supplementary" to state law rather than just a gap-filler.m Additionally, from a
plaintiff's perspective, there may be an important qualitative difference between vindicating a constitutional right and pursuing a state
common law right."' The Constitution carries greater normative force
than the common law, and a plaintiff may derive greater meaning, satisfaction, and feelings of justice from obtaining a ruling that an entity's action violated the constitution than a ruling that the entity's ac-

262 See Memphis Community School Districtv Stachura,477 US 299,306 (1986) (refusing to
allow a plaintiff to recover damages for the abstract injury associated with infringing a constitutional right, but stating that "when § 1983 plaintiffs seek damages for violations of constitutional
rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the
common law of torts").
263 Even with respect to Bivens actions against federal officials, an area in which the Supreme Court has been more restrictive than § 1983 in granting remedies to aggrieved victims, the
Court has emphasized the importance of defining uniform federal remedies that do not turn on
the scope of state law. See Carlson v Green, 446 US 14,23 (1980) (deciding that the availability of
a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which can go forward only if the law of the relevant
state would permit a tort action to proceed, did not eliminate the need for a Bivens remedy
because Bivens actions should not depend on "the vagaries of the laws of the several States").
See also Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1404-05 (cited in note 11) (noting that state law protections "do not substitute for constitutional constraints" because they can be repealed or amended
at any time).
264 Monroe, 365 US at 174-75.
265 Id at 183 ("It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.
The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought
and refused before the federal one is invoked.").
266 See Briscoe v LaHue, 460 US 325, 349 (1983) (Marshall dissenting) ("Different considerations surely apply when a suit is based on a federally guaranteed right-in this case the constitutional right to due process of law-rather than the common law.").
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tions constituted an ordinary tort.26 Depriving victims of constitutional
injuries of this avenue for redress threatens to minimize the emotional
and legal magnitude of their harms. Therefore, the existence of state
tort remedies does not justify exempting private entities from respondeat superior liability under § 1983.
C.

Raising the Cost of Privatization

A final argument against subjecting private entities to respondeat
superior liability under § 1983 is that it will raise the cost of privatization as private parties incorporate the added risk of liability into their
contract prices, which in turn will lead to fewer privatization contracts.2 For opponents of privatization, this may be a welcome result.
But even for proponents of privatization, the risk that private-party
respondeat superior liability under § 1983 will undermine the purported benefits of privatization may not be significant. Initially, given
respondeat superior's pervasiveness in the sphere of private tort law,
the doctrine is fully consistent with privatization. The justification for
privatization is that private entities, through the competitive pressures
of the market, will provide services more cheaply and efficiently than
the government. To the extent that respondeat superior is interwoven
into the fabric of the private market and is considered to promote
efficiency, , it is a principle that underlies the functioning of a healthy
marketplace rather than an antiprivatization concept.
But even if respondeat superior would raise the cost of privatization, that may not be a bad result. To the extent that respondeat superior increases costs, it exacts the greatest cost increase on those firms
that are the biggest civil rights violators, and may help level the playing field for those firms that already take measures to protect constitutional rights. The difficulties of monitoring private contractors that
have caused governments to focus on costs rather than on quality of
service, by contrast, end up rewarding those companies that cut costs
by opting not to invest in liability prevention-such as by paying high267 In his Monroe concurrence, Justice Harlan concluded that "the view that a deprivation
of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state
right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the same act may constitute both a
state tort and a deprivation of a constitutional right" was "consistent with the flavor of the legislative history" of § 1983.365 US at 196 (Harlan concurring).
268 See, for example, Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1454 (cited in note 11) (noting that
increasing regulation of private contractors "increases the costs of privatized programs, undermines the flexibility and efficiency that governments hope to gain through privatization, and
deters private participation").
269 See notes 133-50 and accompanying text.
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er wages to reduce employee turnover or by investing in employee
training programs.n More reputable companies that do spend the extra money to reduce liability risk, on the other hand, can find themselves at a competitive disadvantage. Respondeat superior liability
helps rectify that discrepancy by forcing companies to internalize the
risk of their employees' misconduct. Of course, the less private competition there is, the more muted this leveling effect will be, but respondeat
superior may still provide some check against a "race to the bottom."
Additionally, even if imposing respondeat superior liability would
raise the cost of privatization, it is far from clear that it would have a
significant adverse effect on privatization. There is little evidence that
the current rule of respondeat superior liability for private torts has
dramatically restricted economic growth or business development.2' If
respondeat superior liability results in greater deterrence and therefore
fewer constitutional violations, private entities may even see reduced
litigation expenses and lower liability insurance premiums. Moreover,
the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the Monell custom or policy
requirement "is surely a source of wasteful litigation"' 72 that would become unnecessary if private entities were subject to vicarious liability.
Finally, respondeat superior liability may seem cheap and relatively
nonintrusive when compared to other proposed alternatives for making
private contractors more accountable, such as making private entities
that act under color of state law subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, or by allowing individuals to bring third-party beneficiary
contract actions against private contractors that perform poorly.273
At bottom, the argument that respondeat superior should be rejected because it makes privatization more expensive proves too
much. Taken to its logical conclusion, such an argument would justify
eliminating all liability for private companies, as any liability rule that
applies to private entities would increase expenses. Yet few privatization proponents argue that private entities should be unshackled from

270
271

See note 217 and accompanying text.
See Harper, James, and Gray, 5 Harper,James and Gray on Torts § 26.5 at 22-23 (cited in

note 33).
272

Schuck, 77 Georgetown L J at 1781 (cited in note 70) (arguing that permitting claims against

municipalities may be more efficient, as the "official policy" limitation produces wasteful litigation).
273 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr, Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization:
Making Markets More Accountable through Administrative Law, 28 Fordham Urban L J 1477,
1498-1505 (2001) (arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act should apply to some private
entities); Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 201-07 (cited in note 215) (proposing third-partybeneficiary actions as a way of promoting private accountability); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal
Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 Cal L Rev 569,635-39 (2001) (same).
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all forms of liability and should be regulated only by the market. Rather, the privatization debate seems to focus on identifying the proper
default liability rules against which privatization should take place.
When viewed through that lens, whether a particular liability rule
should operate against private contractors depends on whether the
benefits of increased privatization outweigh the downside of increased
illegal conduct or vice versa. The judgment about how society should
value privatization versus compliance with the Constitution is one that
deserves further exploration, but considering that society generally believes that employers should be responsible for the torts of their employees, imposing § 1983 respondeat superior liability upon private parties performing public functions seems consistent with societal values.
CONCLUSION

In order to prevent incidents like the Blackwater shootings from
occurring again, either domestically or internationally, in an age when
privatization continues to increase and private companies take on ever more sensitive public duties, it is important to think seriously about
the rules and values that should govern how privatization takes place.
In particular, those background rules should focus not only on keeping private entities accountable, but also on making sure that private
companies such as Blackwater display a healthy respect for public
norms. Those values include not just encouraging efficient delivery of
public services but also respect for constitutional rights. If private companies are going to compete for the opportunity to perform traditional
public functions, then one of the axes of competition should be how
well those private companies protect the rights of the citizens they
serve. Imposing respondeat superior liability, in addition to promoting
efficiency goals, will require private companies to compete on that basis
by forcing them to internalize the costs of their employees' misconduct.
Although the possibility of municipal respondeat superior liability is
foreclosed for the moment by Monell, that possibility remains open for
private parties. Regardless of whether Monell may be a sensible rule for
municipalities, extending Monell to private entities is misguided both
because the statutory justification for exempting municipalities from respondeat superior liability does not apply to private parties, and because
policy reasons may favor treating public entities and private entities differently. Consequently, private parties that perform public functions
should be subject to respondeat superior liability under § 1983.
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